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ARTICLES
ACCESS TO ALGORITHMS
Hannah Bloch-Wehba*
Federal, state, and local governments increasingly depend on automated
systems—often procured from the private sector—to make key decisions
about civil rights and liberties. When individuals affected by these decisions
seek access to information about the algorithmic methodologies that
produced them, governments frequently assert that this information is
proprietary and cannot be disclosed.
Recognizing that opaque algorithmic governance poses a threat to civil
rights and liberties, scholars have called for a renewed focus on
transparency and accountability for automated decision-making. But
scholars have neglected a critical avenue for promoting public
accountability and transparency for automated decision-making: the law of
access to government records and proceedings. This Article fills this gap in
the literature, recognizing that the Freedom of Information Act, its state
equivalents, and the First Amendment provide unappreciated legal support
for algorithmic transparency.
The law of access performs three critical functions in promoting
algorithmic accountability and transparency. First, by enabling any
individual to challenge algorithmic opacity in government records and
proceedings, the law of access can relieve some of the burden otherwise
borne by parties who are often poor and underresourced. Second, access
law calls into question government’s procurement of algorithmic decisionmaking technologies from private vendors, subject to contracts that include
sweeping protections for trade secrets and intellectual property rights.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School of Law; Affiliated
Fellow, Information Society Project, Yale Law School. My thanks to Jack Balkin, Emily
Berman, David Cohen, Ellen Goodman, Ben Green, Ben Grunwald, Christina Koningisor,
Irina Manta, Christopher Reed, Rory Van Loo, and Andrew Selbst for helpful conversations
and feedback. I am indebted to Lauren Kirchner and Julia Angwin, now of The Markup, and
to Dick Tofel of ProPublica for bringing this issue to my attention. I am also grateful for the
opportunity to present earlier versions of this project at the Seton Hall Law Artificial
Intelligence and the Law Conference, UC Irvine’s Technology, Law & Society Summer
Institute, Hofstra Law’s Intellectual Property Colloquium, Yale Law School’s Information
Society Project, the Freedom of Expression Scholars Conference, and the Mid-Atlantic Junior
Faculty Forum. Finally, I am indebted to the student editors of the Fordham Law Review for
their meticulous and thoughtful editing. This Article reflects the current state of developments
in February 2020, when it was finalized for publication. All errors are my own.
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Finally, the law of access can promote an urgently needed public debate on
algorithmic governance in the public sector.
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INTRODUCTION
Government decision-making is increasingly automated. Cities use
machine-learning algorithms to track gunshots,1 determine where to send
police on patrol,2 and fire ineffective teachers.3 State agencies use algorithms
1. See Chris Weller, There’s a Secret Technology in 90 US Cities That Listens for
Gunfire 24/7, BUS. INSIDER (June 27, 2017, 10:59 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/
how-shotspotter-works-microphones-detecting-gunshots-2017-6
[https://perma.cc/F6KXR25U].
2. See Stephen Goldsmith & Chris Bousquet, The Right Way to Regulate Algorithms,
CITYLAB (Mar. 20, 2018), citylab.com/equity/2018/03/the-right-way-to-regulate-algorithms/
555998 [https://perma.cc/WWP4-B8YC].
3. See generally Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F.
Supp. 3d 1168 (S.D. Tex. 2017) [hereinafter HISD].
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to predict criminal behavior,4 interpret DNA evidence,5 and allocate
Medicaid benefits.6 Courts decide, using “decision-support” tools, whether
a suspect poses a risk,7 eligibility for pretrial release,8 and how harsh a
sentence to impose.9 The federal government uses algorithms to put
individuals on immigrant and terrorist watchlists,10 make policy decisions
about whether and how to change Social Security,11 and catch tax evaders.12
How are these new technologies changing government decision-making?
“Algorithmic governance”13—a term this Article uses to refer to the use of
automated decision-making methodologies by governments to inform the
policymaking and adjudicative process—might make decision-making
faster, more objective, and more reliable: in other words, more “efficient.”14
But increasing automation may also make government less participatory and
open to public oversight and input.15
This Article examines the potential role of the law of access to government
proceedings and records in promoting algorithmic transparency and
accountability in public sector decision-making.
Courts across the country have already had occasion to consider challenges
to automated determinations arising in sectors such as health care, education,
welfare, and criminal justice and have repeatedly concluded that due process
requires the use of ascertainable public standards that enable those affected
to challenge their determinations.16 In case after case, litigants have

4. See generally Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Illuminating Black Data Policing, 15 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 503 (2018).
5. See generally Second Letter, United States v. Johnson, No. 15-cr-565 (S.D.N.Y. May
9, 2016), ECF No. 41. The author represented ProPublica in this litigation.
6. See generally K.W. ex rel. D.W. v. Armstrong, 789 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2015); Michael
T. v. Bowling, No. 2:15-CV-09655, 2016 WL 4870284, at *2 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 13, 2016),
modified sub nom. Michael T. v. Crouch, No. 2:15-CV-09655, 2018 WL 1513295 (S.D.W.
Va. Mar. 26, 2018); Colin Lecher, What Happens When an Algorithm Cuts Your Health Care,
VERGE (Mar. 21, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/21/17144260/
healthcare-medicaid-algorithm-arkansas-cerebral-palsy [https://perma.cc/7RQY-G8YT].
7. See Richard Berk & Jordan Hyatt, Machine Learning Forecasts of Risk to Inform
Sentencing Decisions, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 222, 222 (2015).
8. See PAMELA M. CASEY ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, OFFENDER RISK &
NEEDS ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS: A PRIMER FOR COURTS (2014), https://www.ncsc.org/~/
media/Microsites/Files/CSI/BJA%20RNA%20Final%20Report_Combined%20Files%20822-14.ashx [https://perma.cc/7995-V78V].
9. See State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 753 (Wis. 2016).
10. See Anil Kalhan, Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of
Technology, Surveillance, and Privacy, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1105, 1136 (2013).
11. See Nicholas Diakopoulos, Accountability in Algorithmic Decision Making, COMM.
ACM, Feb. 2016, at 56, 58–59.
12. See generally Paul Merrion, Nonprofit Think Tank Plays Key Role in IRS DecisionMaking, MLEX U.S. TAX WATCH, Oct. 2018, at 5.
13. See generally Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for
the Smart City, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103 (2018).
14. See Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision
Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1156 (2017).
15. See generally John Danaher, The Threat of Algocracy: Reality, Resistance and
Accommodation, 29 PHIL. & TECH. 245 (2016).
16. See infra Part I.
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sought—and successfully obtained—disclosure of key information about
automated decision-making methodologies in the public sector.17
These challenges are best interpreted as efforts to vindicate an important
set of transparency interests: the right to know why and how the government
reached a particular decision that affects someone.18 As such, these cases
resonate within the broader framework of transparency law, which aims to
open government decision-making to public view. Yet efforts to promote
algorithmic transparency have largely overlooked the body of law that
governs access to government proceedings and records: the Freedom of
Information Act19 (FOIA), its state equivalents, and the First Amendment.20
By codifying expectations regarding the government’s disclosure of
information to the public, the law of transparency and access operates both
to protect the balance of power between the public and the government and
to ensure that key information regarding government decision-making is
open to public scrutiny.21 While these concerns overlap somewhat with
individual interests in understanding how the government has reached
decisions that affect people, they are also distinct in their operation and
effect. Because transparency law protects public rights of access to
government, its remedies—chiefly, the disclosure of government records—
can be sought by those who are unaffected by the particular decisions or
policies they wish to expose.22
17. See infra Part I.
18. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory,
61 B.U. L. REV. 885, 886 (1981); Martha I. Morgan, The Constitutional Right to Know Why,
17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297, 297 (1982); Robert L. Rabin, Job Security and Due Process:
Monitoring Administrative Discretion Through a Reasons Requirement, 44 U. CHI. L. REV.
60, 62–63 (1976); Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and
the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 485 (1986); Richard B. Saphire,
Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to Procedural
Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 113 (1978).
19. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018).
20. But see Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 13, at 133; Coglianese & Lehr, supra note
14, at 22; Paul Schwartz, Data Processing and Government Administration: The Failure of
the American Legal Response to the Computer, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 1376 (1991) (“The
creation of transparent systems of data processing updates a traditional American belief in
open government.”).
21. See, e.g., Margaret B. Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., 65 DUKE L.J. 1361, 1364 (2016) (describing
how FOIA was intended to benefit newsgathering, “facilitating democratic participation and
exposing potential government corruption or malfeasance”) [hereinafter Kwoka, FOIA, Inc.];
see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587–88 (1980) (noting that
the First Amendment has a “structural role” in protecting republican governance, based on
“the antecedent assumption that valuable public debate—as well as other civic behavior—
must be informed”); Margaret B. Kwoka, Deferring to Secrecy, 54 B.C. L. REV. 185, 202–03
(2013) [hereinafter Kwoka, Deferring to Secrecy] (describing how FOIA’s imposition of de
novo review protects the “democratic process of holding the agency accountable to the public”
in the face of agency self-interest).
22. These features are somewhat controversial, in part, because they have permitted
commercial requesters to reap substantial profits from gathering and reselling government
records and, in part, because the onerous burdens on the administrative state tend to threaten
the “capacity and legitimacy of [government] institutions.” See David E. Pozen,
Transparency’s Ideological Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100, 156, 159 (2018) (describing this feature
of U.S. transparency law as the “transparency entitlement” and noting some of its deleterious
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The public-facing structure of transparency law can make several
important contributions to algorithmic transparency and accountability.
First, it can shift the burden of challenging algorithmic opacity from those
who are affected—often poor, underresourced litigants—to the press and the
public, opening up new avenues to address opacity.23 Second, transparency
law calls into question the legality of procurement practices that shield thirdparty vendors from public scrutiny entirely.24 Third, transparency law can
create more enduring prospective obligations for government to disclose its
policies and procedures on a proactive basis.25
Understanding how transparency law maps onto algorithmic governance
sets the stage for future work that addresses the next generation of
automation. As the government procures and relies upon newer, more
sophisticated decision-making technologies, such as machine learning, it also
makes decisions more opaque, harder to explain, and less attributable to
specific causes.26 The greater the decisional power of the technology, the
higher the risk that arbitrary or opaque decisions might evade explanation.
And this apparent arbitrariness, in turn, has engendered potent critiques of
the credibility,27 fairness,28 and due process29 implications of decisionmaking by algorithms significant for our understanding of how automation
might jeopardize individuals’ civil rights and liberties.
These features—some might call them bugs30—have prompted calls for
new mechanisms of transparency and accountability in the age of
algorithms.31 The trouble is that few can agree on how, exactly, society can
advance these values. Scholars have touted a range of mechanisms as
effects); see also Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., supra note 21, at 1415–16 (pointing out that most of the
commercial uses of FOIA are “not within FOIA’s bailiwick”).
23. See infra Part III.A.
24. See infra Part IV.A.
25. See infra Part IV.C.
26. See Jenna Burrell, How the Machine ‘Thinks’: Understanding Opacity in Machine
Learning Algorithms, BIG DATA & SOC’Y, Jan.–June 2016, at 1 (“[R]arely does one have any
concrete sense of how or why a particular classification has been arrived at from inputs.”);
Vijay Pande, Artificial Intelligence’s ‘Black Box’ Is Nothing to Fear, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/25/opinion/artificial-intelligence-black-box.html
[https://perma.cc/MRL5-Q94A].
27. See Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. 1972, 2035 (2017).
28. See Solon Barocas & Andrew Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L.
REV. 671, 723 (2016).
29. See State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 753–54 (Wis. 2016) (denying the defendant
access to a proprietary algorithm used at sentencing); see also ALEX CAMPOLO ET AL., AI NOW
INST., AI NOW 2017 REPORT (2017), https://ainowinstitute.org/AI_Now_2017_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZSC5-F747]; Danielle K. Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society:
Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 32 (2014); Rebecca Wexler,
Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70
STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1369 (2018).
30. See Pande, supra note 26 (“[T]he so-called black box of artificial intelligence is more
of a feature, not a bug.”).
31. See, e.g., Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency in Machine Learning, FAT/ML,
www.fatml.org [https://perma.cc/F4KB-HF2M] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020) (“[T]here is
increasing alarm that the complexity of machine learning may reduce the justification for
consequential decisions to ‘the algorithm made me do it.’”).
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promoting algorithmic transparency and accountability.32 The extensive, and
growing, menu of options includes reverse engineering,33 algorithmic impact
Others have
statements,34 “value-centered design,”35 and audits.36
concluded that machine learning poses no real threat to transparency at all.37
These contributions have in common a key assumption: simply disclosing
the internal workings of many algorithmic decision-making tools—often
encoded in source code or models—is insufficient to vindicate accountability
and transparency interests. First, disclosure is not only ineffective, it is also
legally precluded because these materials are the proper subject of trade
secret protections.38 Second, simply disclosing information about how an
algorithm reaches a decision is insufficient to make that information
meaningful to the subjects.39 As a result, these scholars argue, entirely new
mechanisms for promoting algorithmic accountability and transparency are
required.40
But the rush to assess how best to promote accountability and transparency
in artificial intelligence and machine learning threatens to overlook critical
aspects of algorithmic governance in current use. Even though machine
learning has not yet been widely deployed in government decision-making,
the turn toward algorithmic governance nonetheless already poses serious
32. See, e.g., Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV.
109, 168 (2017) (calling for algorithmic impact statements).
33. NICHOLAS DIAKOPOULOS, TOW CTR. FOR DIG. JOUNRALISM, ALGORITHMIC
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORTING:
ON THE INVESTIGATION OF BLACK BOXES (2013),
http://www.nickdiakopoulos.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Algorithmic-AccountabilityReporting_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6UY-75LS].
34. See, e.g., Selbst, supra note 32, at 168.
35. Cory Knobel & Geoffrey C. Bowker, Values in Design, COMM. ACM, July 2011, at
26, 28.
36. See Julius, FairML: Auditing Black-Box Predictive Models, CLOUDERA FAST
FORWARD LABS (Mar. 9, 2017), https://blog.fastforwardlabs.com/2017/03/09/fairml-auditingblack-box-predictive-models.html [https://perma.cc/XKQ4-ABXE]; see also Nicholas
Diakopoulos et al., Principles for Accountable Algorithms and a Social Impact Statement for
Algorithms,
FAT/ML,
www.fatml.org/resources/principles-for-accountable-algorithms
[https://perma.cc/935U-Z354] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
37. See generally Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Transparency and Algorithmic
Governance, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2019) (contending that algorithmic governance generally
can, although is not guaranteed to, comply with the transparency demands articulated within
administrative law).
38. See, e.g., Wexler, supra note 29, at 1346; see also Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll,
Trust but Verify: A Guide to Algorithms and the Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 9 (2017)
(discussing trade secret protections for decision-making processes used by the private sector);
Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. REV.
54, 119 (2019) (same); Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of
Explainable Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1092 (2018).
39. See Desai & Kroll, supra note 38, at 10 (“In addition, handing over code often will
not enable the political accountability results those in favor of so-called algorithmic
transparency desire.”); Selbst & Barocas, supra note 38, at 1107; Sandra Wachter et al.,
Counterfactual Explanations Without Opening the Black Box: Automated Decisions and the
GDPR, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 841, 862–70 (2018); see also Burrell, supra note 26, at 9.
40. See generally Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633
(2017) (arguing that technological tools can promote algorithmic accountability as well as,
and in some cases better than, legal and policy interventions).
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obstacles to government transparency and accountability. Those obstacles
are attributable, not to the sophistication of decision-making methodologies
but to a more basic shift toward privatization and automation in
government.41 Artificial intelligence and machine learning raise serious, and
specific, challenges to transparency and accountability, but this Article
leaves for another day the project of considering how transparency law
should respond.
This Article contributes to ongoing debates about algorithmic
accountability and transparency in three ways.42 First, by cataloging a range
of proprietary algorithmic decision-support and decision-making tools relied
upon in different civil, criminal, and administrative contexts, it highlights
how extensively privatization and outsourcing have affected civil rights and
liberties. This impact extends beyond criminal law enforcement to other
cutting-edge cases arising in civil contexts that have received scant scholarly
attention. Taken as a group, these cases illustrate an important pattern in
challenges to algorithmic decision-making: litigants are equally motivated
to seek transparency of the government decision-making process as they are
to challenge the substance of algorithmic decisions.
Second, this Article rehabilitates disclosure as a remedy for algorithmic
opacity in the public sector. Algorithmic governance in the public sector
heightens the interest in disclosure of key information regarding how
automated decision-making functions. Disclosure is the core mechanism of
U.S. transparency law, which enshrines values of public access to
government decision-making.43 But disclosure has been given short shrift as
a mechanism for algorithmic accountability and transparency.44

41. See Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1323 (2017)
(noting that transparency and disclosure obligations proposed for private enterprise “may be
appropriate for governmental commercial algorithms”).
42. This Article contributes to a growing body of interdisciplinary scholarship that
explores the accountability gap for new technologies of decision-making. See, e.g.,
DIAKOPOULOS, supra note 33; Mike Ananny & Kate Crawford, Seeing Without Knowing:
Limitations of the Transparency Ideal and Its Application to Algorithmic Accountability, 20
NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 973 (2018); Barocas & Selbst, supra note 28; Burrell, supra note 26;
Danielle K. Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249 (2008); Citron &
Pasquale, supra note 29; Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward
a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93 (2014); Danaher,
supra note 15; Paul B. de Laat, Big Data and Algorithmic Decision-Making: Can
Transparency Restore Accountability?, ACM SIGCAS COMPUTERS & SOC’Y, Sept. 2017, at
39; Katyal, supra note 38.
43. See, e.g., Tax Analysts v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 845 F.2d 1060, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(“[T]he settled policy of the FOIA is one of ‘full agency disclosure . . . .’” (quoting S. REP.
NO. 89-813 (1965))), aff’d, 492 U.S. 136 (1989); see also David E. Pozen, Freedom of
Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1102–03
(2017) (“The engine of the FOIA system is the request for a government record.”).
44. This Article relates to a growing body of work that studies how the relationship
between government and technology companies affects accountability and transparency. See,
e.g., Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 13; Catherine Crump, Surveillance Policy Making by
Procurement, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1595 (2016); David S. Levine, The People’s Trade Secrets,
18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 61 (2011); see also Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Exposing
Secret Searches: A First Amendment Right of Access to Electronic Surveillance Orders, 93
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The primary obstacle to transparency is the pervasive practice of invoking
trade secrecy to shield the methodologies of automated decision-making
from scrutiny.45 Without resources to develop automated decision-making
tools in-house, governments have often turned to decision-support systems
purchased from the private sector. These systems frequently come with
license agreements, memoranda of understanding, or other documentation
evincing claims that the contents are trade secrets.46
Viewed from the perspective of transparency law, the invocation of
commercial confidentiality and trade secrecy to shield government decisionmaking from public view is legally suspect.47 These provisions cast doubt
on the government’s ability to agree, through contract, to utilize decisionmaking mechanisms that are inconsistent with these broad public-serving
goals. In practice, this sometimes puts government to a difficult choice:
reveal a contractor’s trade secret or give up the use of an algorithmic tool
Governments should implement transparency values
altogether.48
throughout their contracting and procurement processes to ensure that
proprietary decision-support tools are consistent with these aims.
Finally, this Article reframes the debate about algorithmic transparency
from affected individuals to the affected public.49 Existing scholarship has
often considered whether trade secrecy interests should yield to the interests
of individuals who are affected by algorithmic decision-making—namely,
individuals with a sufficient liberty or property interest at stake.50 In the
criminal justice context, scholars and advocates have embraced the use of
protective orders to ensure that defendants have access to the algorithms that
confer risk scores or analyze DNA or breathalyzer evidence—without
jeopardizing trade secrets.51
These compromises between the private vendors’ commercial interests
and the liberty interests of those affected by algorithmic governance overlook
the public’s separate and independent interest in oversight and monitoring of
government decision-making. In the criminal context, the constitutional
WASH. L. REV. 145 (2018); Kristen Eichensehr, Public-Private Cybersecurity, 95 TEX. L. REV.
467 (2017).
45. Katyal, supra note 38, at 60 (“In the context of artificial intelligence, we see a world
where, at times, intellectual property principles prevent civil rights from adequately addressing
the challenges of technology, thus stagnating a new generation of civil rights altogether.”); see
also Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 37, at 33 (citing Loomis as support for the proposition that
transparency principles do not compel disclosure of source code).
46. Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 13, at 138–39.
47. See, e.g., DIAKOPOULOS, supra note 33.
48. See discussion infra Part I.B.
49. See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, The Undue Influence of Surveillance Technology
Companies on Policing, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 101, 119 (2017); Natalie Ram, Innovating
Criminal Justice, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 659, 686 (2018); David G. Robinson, The Challenges
of Prediction: Lessons from Criminal Justice, 14 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 151, 167
(2018).
50. See, e.g., Citron, supra note 42, at 1254–55; Roth, supra note 27, at 2028; Wexler,
supra note 29, at 1349.
51. See, e.g., Wexler, supra note 29, at 1353 (“[C]ourts may issue protective orders to
limit the use and distribution of trade secrets beyond the needs of the proceeding.”).
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right of access to government proceedings and records casts doubt on
whether prosecutors and courts can selectively disclose proprietary
algorithms to affected individuals while shielding them from the public.52
More broadly, selective disclosure tends to ignore the First Amendment’s
“structural” role for the press and public in monitoring government
proceedings.53
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I traces the emerging use of, and
challenges to, proprietary, automated decision systems in health care,
criminal justice, and education. Part II unpacks how these challenges both
assert the individual due process rights of litigants and also invoke the larger
public interest in support of enhanced transparency. Part III explores the
procedural and substantive conflicts between proprietary decision-making on
the one hand and government transparency obligations under the First
Amendment and FOIA on the other. Part IV briefly sketches some remedial
measures that governments might take in order to alleviate concerns about
the accountability and transparency of algorithmic governance.
I. THE RISE OF PUBLIC SECTOR ALGORITHMS
It is hardly groundbreaking to observe that algorithms are increasingly
prevalent in the public sector. New technologies are supposed to make it
easier for humans to make difficult decisions—and where is decision-making
more difficult, or more important, than in government? The kinds of
decisions that the public sector must make are high stakes: whether an
individual who is arrested for murder, but claims he acted in self-defense,
should be released from detention or stay in jail;54 whether a person who is
profoundly disabled and requires home care in order to avoid being
institutionalized should receive $70,000 or $140,000 in Medicaid waiver
benefits;55 whether a public school teacher whose students perform worse
than their peers on a statewide test should be laid off.56
These scenarios are not simply hypotheticals. They represent flash points
between emerging methods of algorithmic decision-making and the rights of
individuals to understand and challenge those decisions. This Part surveys
these conflicts, observing that increasing automation57 and privatization58 of
52. Vera Eidelman, The First Amendment Case for Public Access to Secret Algorithms
Used in Criminal Trials, 34 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 915, 938 (2018).
53. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587–88 (1980).
54. State v. Sanders, No. A-4350-16T6, 2017 WL 5495101, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. Nov. 16, 2017).
55. Michael T. v. Bowling, No. 2:15-CV-09655, 2016 WL 4870284, at *2 (S.D.W. Va.
Sept. 13, 2016), modified sub nom. Michael T. v. Crouch, No. 2:15-CV-09655, 2018 WL
1513295 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 26, 2018).
56. See HISD, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1171 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
57. Citron, supra note 42, at 1252.
58. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New
Administrative Law, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 813, 822 (2000) (distinguishing “contracting out”
from privatization); Daniel Guttman, Public Purpose and Private Service: The Twentieth
Century Culture of Contracting Out and the Evolving Law of Diffused Sovereignty, 52 ADMIN.
L. REV. 859 (2000); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
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decision-making are at the root of new challenges to algorithmic
determinations.
A note about methodology: these cases and contexts were chosen because
they keenly present the clash between vendors that provide algorithmic
decision-making tools, governments that deploy such tools, private
individuals who wish to challenge these outcomes, and the general public.
Although the case law remains relatively scant, it was surprising to see the
number of reported decisions that illustrate these structural dynamics
prevalent in challenges to algorithmic opacity. Nonetheless, this account is
not exhaustive, and other cases likely exist that illustrate these patterns.
Although this dynamic has garnered particular attention in the context of
the criminal justice system,59 the proprietary nature of many algorithmic
governance tools poses significant obstacles to individuals who seek to
challenge algorithmic determinations in a variety of contexts.60 The precise
substance of these disputes matters less than the overarching pattern: these
cases frequently present a clash of interests between government’s increasing
reliance on proprietary tools, procured from private contractors or vendors,
and transparency requirements.
The clash between transparency and proprietary interests is particularly
pronounced when individuals seek to challenge the outcomes of
adjudications—whether judicial or administrative—that affect their civil
rights and liberties. Notably, however, the new challenges to algorithmic
governance do not rise and fall on the substance of an algorithmic decision.
Rather, the most successful challenges to algorithmic decision-making
reflect demands for more information regarding the ways in which
government is reaching its decisions: in other words, demands for
transparency and access to information about the process.
A. Medicaid
Challenges to proprietary decision-making in the context of Medicaid are
illustrative. For years, lower courts have been dealing with procedural due
process claims as state Medicaid agencies privatized their decision-making

1367 (2003); Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New
Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229 (2003); Paul Starr, The Meaning of Privatization, 6 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 6 (1988); see also Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, 33 YALE
J. ON REG. 547, 590 (2016).
59. See, e.g., Kiel Brennan-Marquez, “Plausible Cause”: Explanatory Standards in the
Age of Powerful Machines, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1249 (2017); Jessica Gabel Cino, Deploying the
Secret Police: The Use of Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System, 34 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
1073 (2018); Aziz Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. 1043
(2019); Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218 (2019); Ram, supra note
49; Roth, supra note 27; Ric Simmons, Big Data, Machine Judges, and the Legitimacy of the
Criminal Justice System, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1067 (2018); Sonja Starr, Evidence-Based
Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803 (2014);
Wexler, supra note 29.
60. See, e.g., Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 13; Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 14;
Katyal, supra note 38; Selbst & Barocas, supra note 38.
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and began to use algorithmic methods to reduce recipients’ benefits.61
Examining these cases makes clear that the shift toward algorithmic
governance goes hand-in-hand with other measures that are intended to cut
costs and have the (perhaps unintended) secondary effect of reducing
accountability and transparency as well. Agencies often rely on the
“objectivity” or “efficiency” of their data-driven decision-making procedures
to justify cost-cutting measures, such as terminating employees or cutting
Medicaid benefits.62 But as agencies turn toward more “objective” decisionmaking procedures, they often rely on private contractors who use
proprietary, closed-source methods to make decisions about these
constitutional rights.63
The privatization and automation of decision-making regarding Medicaid
benefits present clear tensions with principles of procedural due process.
When individuals receive Medicaid or other public assistance benefits, those
benefits are “treated as a form of ‘property.’”64 Consequently, Medicaid
benefits cannot be reduced or terminated without satisfying certain
safeguards set out in the Medicaid Act65 and the Constitution’s procedural
due process guarantees.66
These statutory and constitutional protections require the government to
explain why and how it decided to terminate or reduce benefits. Under
federal Medicaid regulations, notices of terminations or reductions in
benefits are required to contain “a clear statement of the specific reasons
supporting the intended action.”67 Moreover, under the Medicaid Act,
individuals must receive the opportunity for a “fair hearing” to challenge the
denial of benefits.68 Any “termination, suspension, or reduction of” benefits
61. This move is perhaps best understood as a form of “bureaucratic disentitlement.”
Michael Lipsky, Bureaucratic Disentitlement in Social Welfare Programs, 58 SOC. SERV.
REV. 3, 3 (1984) (defining “bureaucratic disentitlement” as a mode of “retrenchment” in which
“obligations to social welfare beneficiaries are reduced and circumscribed through largely
obscure ‘bureaucratic’ actions and inactions of public authorities”); see also VIRGINIA
EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY 49 (1st ed. 2018) (describing how Indiana privatized and
automated its welfare systems in order to cut costs); Vicki Lens, Bureaucratic Disentitlement
After Welfare Reform: Are Fair Hearings the Cure?, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 13,
13 (2005) (“One of the few avenues for challenging bureaucratic disentitlement is the fair
hearing system. However, little is known about how the fair hearing system is faring under
welfare reform.”).
62. MEREDITH WHITTAKER ET AL., AI NOW INST., AI NOW REPORT 2018, at 18 (2018),
https://ainowinstitute.org/AI_Now_2018_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9CA-SYC8] (“Often
adopted under the theory that they will improve government efficiency or cost-savings,
[automated decision systems] seek to aid or replace various decision-making processes and
policy determinations.”).
63. Id.
64. Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 128 (1985).
65. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 343 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
66. See Lewis v. Rendell, 501 F. Supp. 2d 671, 692 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (finding it “well
established” that Medicaid recipients have a property interest in their benefits and collecting
cases); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(3) (2018) (requiring a fair hearing under the Medicaid
Act).
67. 42 C.F.R. § 431.210(b) (2019).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(3).
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or eligibility triggers the statutory requirement for a hearing.69 In a separate
provision of the Act, Congress also required state agencies to base Medicaid
waiver budgets on a “methodology that uses valid, reliable cost data [which]
is open to public inspection, and includes a calculation of the expected cost
of such services.”70 Likewise, procedural due process requires agencies to
employ “ascertainable standards” in decision-making.71
These protections remain vital to prevent the wrongful termination of
benefits, even as states have increasingly turned toward the private sector to
provide various Medicaid services. A 2006 Government Accountability
Office report investigating the protection of personal health information
found that 96 percent of state Medicaid agencies used vendors to perform
various administrative services, including enrollment and benefits
management.72 As states have turned to managed care organizations to
administer benefits, private companies have become the primary providers
of public Medicaid benefits in many states.73
In turn, vendors have adopted a range of new algorithmic tools to help
make the management of Medicaid more efficient.74 Yet new mechanisms
for administering Medicaid have created tensions with constitutional and
statutory demands of openness. In 2015, a group of West Virginians with
severe intellectual and developmental disabilities brought suit against the
state’s Department of Health and Human Resources, challenging the state’s
reliance on a proprietary algorithm to reduce critical Medicaid benefits.75
The plaintiffs had received Medicaid waiver benefits for decades under the
state’s home and community-based care program, which supported the

69. 42 C.F.R. §§ 431.201, 431.206(c).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(j)(5)(D).
71. Lightfoot v. District of Columbia, 448 F.3d 392, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Holmes v.
N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 612
(5th Cir. 1964).
72. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-676, DOMESTIC AND OFFSHORE
OUTSOURCING OF PERSONAL INFORMATION IN MEDICARE, MEDICAID, AND TRICARE 9 (2006),
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06676.pdf [https://perma.cc/VUL9-C9HQ].
73. See Isaac D. Buck, Managing Medicaid, 11 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 107,
111–12 (2017) (summarizing the status quo of Medicaid managed care); Vernon K. Smith et
al., Medicaid Reforms to Expand Coverage, Control Costs and Improve Care: Results from
a 50-State Medicaid Budget Survey for State Fiscal Years 2015 and 2016, KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.kff.org/report-section/medicaid-reforms-to-expandcoverage-control-costs-and-improve-care-managed-care-reforms
[https://perma.cc/TJ9XT7PM] (“Managed care is now the predominant delivery system for Medicaid in most
states.”).
74. EUBANKS, supra note 61, at 52–53 (describing the results of Indiana’s decision to
privatize and automate substantial aspects of its administration of benefits); see also Dave
Stafford, Update: IBM to Appeal $78M Breach of Contract Award to State, IND. LAW. (Aug.
7, 2017), https://www.theindianalawyer.com/articles/44441-update-ibm-to-appeal-78mbreach-of-contract-award-to-state [https://perma.cc/TY38-GG9V] (summarizing litigation
that ensued after Indiana terminated IBM’s contract).
75. First Amended Complaint for Injunctive & Declaratory Relief, Michael T. v. Bowling,
No. 2:15-CV-09655, 2016 WL 4870284 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 13, 2016), ECF No. 14 [hereinafter
First Amended Complaint].
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provision of key services that enabled them to live at home or in the
community instead of being institutionalized.76
These benefits were administered by a “waiver administrator,” APS
Healthcare Inc., a private company tasked with allocating waiver benefits and
generating budgets for the benefits and care for which the recipients were
eligible.77 Under its contract, APS bore responsibility for annual assessments
to measure recipients’ “abilities and needs,” to ensure that recipients of
waiver funds were eligible to receive funds and to come up with a budget
allocating benefits to each recipient.78 It did so by gathering data through
interviews and “standard assessment tools” and then applying a proprietary
algorithm that generated a budget to cover authorized waiver benefits.79
The problem was that each year, the algorithm spat out a budget that
appeared totally unrelated to the actual cost of providing the care which the
plaintiffs required.80 APS sent letters to each recipient “notifying him or her
of the budget amount without explanation as to how that number was
determined.”81 In many cases, the algorithm-generated budget was slashed
by tens of thousands of dollars from the year before. But the plaintiffs’
conditions were stable; most of them had not improved in functionality or
ability since they were teenagers, suggesting that, year over year, they would
require roughly the same benefits and hours of services.82
Nonetheless, the plaintiffs had little success in appealing to human
decision makers to reverse the algorithm’s senseless, arbitrary, and
unexplained reductions in benefits. In boilerplate letters, APS contended that
it could not exceed the “algorithm-generated budget.”83 The plaintiffs had
no further success at the “fair hearings” required by the Medicaid Act. Both
the contractor and administrative judges were highly deferential to the
algorithmic decision-making process, refusing to override—or even
investigate—the algorithm’s conclusions.84
The results were catastrophic. One plaintiff, Tara R., a twenty-seven-yearold woman who has “cerebral palsy, a severe intellectual disability, and
limited hand functioning,” functioned at an “age equivalent of nine
months.”85 She lived at home with her father and her disabled stepmother
until 2014 when her benefits were cut from about $130,000 to about $72,000,
making it impossible to keep her in her family home. When the benefits were
76. See id. at 1–2.
77. Id. at 2.
78. Michael T. v. Bowling, No. 2:15-CV-09655, 2016 WL 4870284, at *2 (S.D.W. Va.
Sept. 13, 2016), modified sub nom. Michael T. v. Crouch, No. 2:15-CV-09655, 2018 WL
1513295 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 26, 2018).
79. Id.
80. First Amended Complaint, supra note 75, at 11, 14, 19, 25.
81. Michael T. v. Crouch, No. 2:15-CV-09655, 2018 WL 1513295, at *2 (S.D.W. Va.
Mar. 26, 2018).
82. First Amended Complaint, supra note 75, at 10, 13–14, 18, 24.
83. Id. at 12, 15–16, 20, 21.
84. Id. Exhibits 3–4, at 12–24 (rendering decisions in “fair hearings” that sought to
challenge the budgets).
85. Id. at 29.
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slashed, Tara was moved to an emergency care facility and then to a group
home, where she became “lethargic” and “unwilling to engage with
others.”86 Due to these changes, the plaintiffs alleged, Tara was at “serious
risk of being institutionalized.”87
The court rightly rejected this framework, agreeing with the plaintiffs that
the APS algorithm could not satisfy the Constitution’s procedural due
process requirements.88 Noting that the government had provided “no
information as to what factors are incorporated into the APS Algorithm, how
each factor is weighted, or the overarching methodology APS utilizes,” the
court faulted APS for failing to employ “ascertainable standards” in making
their determinations.89 Moreover, APS had failed to even include “any
individualized rationale” for the budgets allocated to the plaintiffs, making it
impossible for plaintiffs to “meaningfully challenge” the budgets.90
Concerned that the “lack of transparency” in the algorithm rendered the
determinations “potentially rudderless,” the district court concluded that the
APS decision-making process created an “unacceptable risk of arbitrary and
‘erroneous deprivation[s].’”91
But these problems were not irresolvable. While the court enjoined the
department from continuing to use the APS algorithm, it reasoned that
requiring the state to develop a decision-making methodology that actually
used ascertainable standards would not impose an undue “fiscal or
administrative” burden.92 In response, West Virginia developed a new
system that replaced the proprietary APS algorithm with “matrices
employing a number of clearly identified variables based on a combination
of a member’s living situation and answers to specific questions during the
member’s annual assessment.”93 The state promised that the matrix would
be “publicly available” and that recipients would be able to challenge both
the accuracy of the static factors that constituted inputs into the matrix and
the application of the matrix itself.94 Concluding that the new system
sufficiently remedied the due process flaws in the APS algorithm, the court
lifted the injunction.95
Secretive determinations about benefit eligibility have widespread
implications for a range of other interests, including those of other
beneficiaries, possible future beneficiaries, their attorneys and social
86. Id. at 32–33.
87. Id. at 34.
88. Michael T. v. Bowling, No. 2:15-CV-09655, 2016 WL 4870284, at *10 (S.D.W. Va.
Sept. 13, 2016), modified sub nom. Michael T. v. Crouch, No. 2:15-CV-09655, 2018 WL
1513295 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 26, 2018).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at *11 (alteration in original) (quoting Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S.
748, 792 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
92. Id.
93. Michael T. v. Crouch, No. 2:15-CV-09655, 2018 WL 1513295, at *6 (S.D.W. Va.
Mar. 26, 2018).
94. Id. at *10.
95. Id. at *1.
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workers, and even state and federal taxpayers. But West Virginia is hardly
alone in resisting disclosure of these decision-making methods. A similar
case arising in Idaho makes plain the clash between privatized and automated
governance on the one hand and due process guarantees on the other.96 Like
the West Virginia plaintiffs, the Idaho plaintiffs challenged the state’s use of
a proprietary, secret methodology to determine their individual budgets for
home and community-based waiver benefits.97 The state offered a
compromise: it would disclose the methodology to the plaintiffs, but only if
they assented to a confidentiality agreement that provided that the “details of
the budget-setting methodology . . . may not be discussed or revealed to
anyone, in any manner, except for purposes of administrative appeal and
judicial review.”98
Idaho’s position that its methodology was a “trade secret” ran headlong
into its statutory obligation to use a methodology that was “open to public
inspection.”99 The parties—and the court—ultimately rejected this attempt
to shield the methodology from public disclosure.100 Instead, after some
back-and-forth, the parties stipulated to a preliminary injunction that the
agency would make the budget-calculating tool, as well as a range of
supporting documents necessary to understand the tool, available to
participants in the waiver program upon request.101 In addition, the
department promised to make most of the same materials available to
members of the public under Idaho public records laws.102
Though Idaho’s attempt at a compromise ultimately failed, its invocation
of trade secrecy exemplifies a troubling trend in approaches to algorithmic
accountability. Idaho’s offer to make the information available to plaintiffs,
subject to a gag order that prevented them from discussing the methodology,
typifies what I call “atomized disclosure”—an approach that seeks to solve
due process problems by disclosing information to the affected parties, but
only on the condition that they not further disclose it. For the reasons
discussed in Part IV, atomized disclosure is highly problematic: it creates
serious First Amendment concerns, public policy issues, and inefficiencies.
B. Education
Proprietary algorithmic governance has invited due process challenges in
other sectors as well. As school systems have attempted to become more
96. See generally K.W. ex rel. D.W. v. Armstrong, 789 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2015).
97. See generally Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
& Preliminary Injunction, K.W. ex rel. D.W. v. Armstrong, No. 1:12-CV-22-BLW (D. Idaho
Jan. 19, 2012), ECF No. 4-1 [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Brief].
98. Declaration of Katherine Takasugi at 7, K.W. ex rel. D.W., No. 1:12-CV-22-BLW (D.
Idaho Jan. 30, 2012), ECF No. 25-1.
99. Plaintiffs’ Brief at 11, supra note 97 (requiring budgets to be based upon “a
methodology that uses valid, reliable cost data, is open to public inspection, and includes a
calculation of the expected cost of such services”).
100. Preliminary Injunction at 2, K.W. ex rel. D.W., No. 1:12-CV-22-BLW (D. Idaho Mar.
12, 2012), ECF No. 41.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 5.
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accountable, they have turned toward data-driven tools to measure
educational outcomes and improve educational effectiveness.103 These tools
have altered educational practices at all levels of the school system,
transforming how teachers engage students in the classroom,104 how states
rate school performance,105 and how districts measure progress.106 As in the
context of Medicaid privatization, the mechanisms of data-driven education
reform are also often privately developed, further entrenching private power
in classroom teaching, assessment, and data collection itself.107 These new
practices are also occurring within the political context of a push for “freemarket” reforms that map the practices of for-profit businesses onto public
institutions.108
“Value-added assessment” reflects this push toward data-driven education
policy. Value-added assessments, or “value-added measures,” assess teacher
quality by examining and tracking student test scores in order to measure the
effect that teachers have on student performance over time.109 Value-added
103. See, e.g., DARRELL M. WEST, BROOKINGS, BIG DATA FOR EDUCATION: DATA MINING,
DATA ANALYTICS, AND WEB DASHBOARDS 1, 9 (2012), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/04-education-technology-west.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7HK-UM79]
(describing data-driven reforms as facilitating “the overall accountability” of school
operations); John West, Data, Democracy and School Accountability: Controversy over
School Evaluation in the Case of DeVasco High School, BIG DATA & SOC’Y, Jan.–June 2017,
at 1, 2 (describing how a “hopeful theory of data-driven systems of accountability and political
legitimacy was embedded in a nation-wide policy-making revolution in public education that
began in 2002 with the passage of the federal No Child Left Behind legislation”); see also
Race to the Top Fund, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (June 6, 2016), https://www2.ed.gov/programs/
racetothetop/index.html [https://perma.cc/KZD6-JWS5] (encouraging states to “[b]uild[] data
systems that measure student growth and success, and inform teachers and principals about
how they can improve instruction”).
104. See generally Elana Zeide, The Structural Consequences of Big Data-Driven
Education, 5 BIG DATA 164 (2017); Benjamin Herold, The Future of Big Data and Analytics
in K–12 Education, EDUC. WK. (Jan. 11, 2016), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2016/
01/13/the-future-of-big-data-and-analytics.html [https://perma.cc/NXK5-PNX2].
105. Alyson Klein, How Are States Measuring Student Growth Under ESSA?, EDUC. WK.
(Jan. 23, 2019), https://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/2019/01/essa-growth-datastate-data-quality-campaign.html [https://perma.cc/S4KR-6EXM].
106. For a discussion of HISD, see infra Part I.B.
107. Zeide, supra note 104, at 168 (“By relocating the site of pedagogical functions, datadriven education technologies make it more difficult for students, parents, and communities
to exercise agency and demand accountability.”); see also DIANE RAVITCH, THE DEATH AND
LIFE OF THE GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL SYSTEM 199–200 (2010) (describing how private
philanthropic foundations “came to exercise vast influence over American education because
of their strategic investments in school reform”); Jill P. Koyama, Generating, Comparing,
Manipulating, Categorizing, Reporting, and Sometimes Fabricating Data to Comply with No
Child Left Behind Mandates, 26 J. EDUC. POL’Y 701, 702 (2011) (“[T]he federal government’s
current intervention into public education has become inextricably bound to market-based
‘reform’ and privatization.”).
108. RAVITCH, supra note 107, at 177–78 (“These free-market reformers advocated testing,
accountability, merit pay, and charter schools, and most were notably hostile to unions. The
unions objected to the reformers’ efforts to judge teachers solely by their students’ test scores,
and the reformers sought to break the powers of the unions.”).
109. See generally Chris Thorn & Douglas N. Harris, The Accidental Revolution: Teacher
Accountability, Value-Added, and the Shifting Balance of Power in the American School
System, in THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF ACCOUNTABILITY: DATA USE AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN EDUCATION 57 (Dorothea Anagnostopoulos et al. eds., 2013).
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assessments are used beyond classroom teaching as well: they can also shed
light on the soundness of teacher education itself.110
Like privatization in health care, value-added assessments also purport to
be a more “objective” way to cut costs in a financially precarious
environment. Budget shortfalls in school districts across America have
prompted some districts to lay off teachers.111 Vividly invoking the language
of private enterprise, a 2001 report supportive of value-added measures
compared educational systems to other businesses, writing, “[M]anagers in
most industries would attempt to target layoffs so as to cause as little damage
as possible to productivity—less productive workers would be dismissed or
furloughed before more productive workers.”112
Teachers’ unions have been at the forefront of efforts to resist these
transformations and have fought against district efforts to cut costs by
terminating teachers who do not measure up in “value-added” terms. A
recent case from Houston, Texas—one of the largest school districts in the
country113—illustrates a successful union-led effort to end the district’s
reliance on “privately developed algorithms” to determine whether public
school teachers were “ineffective” and should be terminated.114 Just as in
the Medicaid cases, the case concerned the outsourcing of government
services to a private company that employed proprietary algorithms to make
critical decisions that implicated due process rights.115
The Houston Independent School District (HISD) had contracted with
SAS, a private company that developed a “value-added statistical model”
known as the Educational Value-Added Assessment System (EVAAS), to
aid in evaluating teacher effectiveness.116 Teachers who have tenure, or who
are employed under “continuing contracts,” have a “property interest in
continued employment.”117 But HISD made it a goal to “exit” its
110. See generally Marilyn Cochran-Smith, Assessing Assessment in Teacher Education,
54 J. TEACHER EDUC. 187 (2003).
111. See, e.g., F. Davenport, HISD Announces Layoffs Due to $115 Million Budget
Shortfall, CW39 HOUS. (Apr. 27, 2018), https://cw39.com/2018/04/27/hisd-announceslayoffs-due-to-budget-shortfall [https://perma.cc/D9VX-5MYD]; Linda Greenstein, Budget
Shortfall Leads to 52 Methuen Teacher Layoffs, BOS. GLOBE (June 7, 2018),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/regionals/north/2018/06/07/budget-shortfall-leadsmethuen-teacher-layoffs/N5urFDIHPEP20ufPqtfAFM/story.html
[https://perma.cc/8PC8W4KR]; Eric Weddle, Indianapolis Public Schools to Cut $22M from Budget, Teacher Layoffs
Possible, WFYI (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.wfyi.org/news/articles/indianapolis-publicschools-to-cut-22m-from-budget [https://perma.cc/7JKU-XCGT].
112. STEVEN GLAZERMAN ET AL., BROOKINGS, EVALUATING TEACHERS: THE IMPORTANT
ROLE OF VALUE-ADDED 1, 9 (2010), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/
1117_evaluating_teachers.pdf [https://perma.cc/GT7U-YYV3].
113. Table 215.30. Enrollment, Poverty, and Federal Funds for the 120 Largest School
Districts, by Enrollment Size in 2015: Selected Years, 2014–15 Through 2017, NAT’L CTR.
FOR EDUC. STAT., https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d17/tables/dt17_215.30.asp [https://
perma.cc/Q6FD-MF2P] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
114. HISD, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1171 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
115. See generally id.
116. Id. at 1172.
117. Id. at 1173. Cf. Trout v. Knox Cty. Bd. of Educ., 163 F. Supp. 3d 492, 507 (E.D.
Tenn. 2016) (upholding the use of a proprietary algorithmic teacher evaluation model to deny
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“ineffective” teachers and to retain only those who showed sufficient student
growth, as measured by the EVAAS.118
The new policy resulted in the dismissal of at least twelve teachers on
continuing contracts.119 But because of the proprietary nature of the EVAAS
algorithm, the teachers and school district lacked sufficient information to
understand how the program functioned.120 The teachers and the union who
challenged the program described it as “complex and opaque.”121 Because
SAS treated the software and algorithms as “trade secrets” and refused to
divulge them, not even HISD had access to them.122
Like the Medicaid cases, the HISD case presented a significant conflict
between the plaintiffs’ desire to access information about how the EVAAS
methodology functioned, the claimed interest in secrecy, and the public
interest. In the course of discovery, the parties negotiated a framework
through which SAS would disclose certain trade secrets—including the
source code, models, and methodologies for the EVAAS—to the plaintiffs’
attorneys and experts on an “attorney eyes only” basis.123 The court entered
a protective order that provided, in part, that none of the protected
information could be disclosed to anyone outside the scope of the
litigation.124 Shortly after the court entered the protective order, the
plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Jesse Rothstein, inspected the source code for
EVAAS.125 He then prepared an expert report which concluded, in part, that
teachers could not “meaningfully verify” their EVAAS scores.126
The teachers’ union posted a litigation update on its website referring to
Dr. Rothstein’s report.127 SAS promptly filed a motion for contempt and for
sanctions, complaining that the blog post—which concededly contained none
of the company’s trade secrets or other proprietary information—violated the
protective order because it could only have been written based on Dr.
Rothstein’s “observations [and]/or conclusions” of EVAAS.128 In SAS’s
view, the protective order meant to “prevent Plaintiffs and all of Plaintiffs’

bonuses because “an employee performance evaluation is not a sufficient property interest to
invoke procedural due process protections”).
118. HISD, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1174–75.
119. Id. at 1175.
120. Id. at 1176 (finding that teachers lack access to “the computer algorithms and data
necessary to verify the accuracy of their scores”).
121. Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint at 14–15, HISD, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168 (No. 4:14cv-01189), ECF No. 23.
122. HISD, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1176.
123. See generally Protective Order over SAS Institute Inc. Information, HISD, 251 F.
Supp. 3d 1168 (No. 4:14-cv-01189), ECF No. 47-1.
124. Id.
125. Order at 3, HISD, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168 (No. 4:14-cv-01189), ECF No. 59.
126. Id.
127. See generally Exhibit C, HISD, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168 (No. 4:14-cv-01189), ECF No.
54-3.
128. SAS Institute Inc.’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Interpretation of Protective
Order and Motion for Contempt at 5, HISD, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168 (No. 4:14-cv-01189), ECF
No. 54 (alteration in original).
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experts from continuing any public discourse against EVAAS.”129 The court
rejected SAS’s “overly broad interpretation,” finding that, if adopted, it
would “inhibit legitimate discussion about the lawsuit” among union
members and among the general public.130
The court was equally suspicious of SAS’s secrecy claims on the merits
and agreed that relying on a secret algorithm, the outcome of which the
plaintiffs could not challenge, raised serious procedural due process
concerns.131 Most significantly, the methodology could not establish the
reason for a teacher’s dismissal “in sufficient detail so as to enable him to
show any error that may exist.”132 Those concerns were not remediated by
HISD’s effort to make available general information about the EVAAS
methodology.133 As in the West Virginia case, the court agreed with the
plaintiffs that the use of a secret, proprietary methodology would make it
impossible for the affected party to raise a meaningful challenge at a hearing.
This did not mean that the court would require SAS to disclose its trade
secrets—the court recognized that the plaintiffs could not constitutionally
“put SAS out of business.”134 But if the methodology was unconstitutional,
the policy likely had to be overturned. A few months after the court denied
the school district’s motion for summary judgment, the district settled with
the union, abandoning EVAAS and paying the union’s attorney’s fees.135
C. Criminal Law Enforcement
1. Policing
Proprietary algorithmic governance is widespread in policing.136 Consider
the example of the gunshot detection company ShotSpotter: the service,
which is employed by over ninety jurisdictions across the country, uses
sensors to discern the sound of gunfire and triangulate its location, pushing a
notification to emergency services.137 Cities subscribe to ShotSpotter’s
services; the company installs the sensors, and the city receives the
notifications from the company’s software.138 But ShotSpotter has often
taken the view that the data it generates about where gunshots occur is a

129. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
130. Order, supra note 125, at 6.
131. HISD, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1180 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
132. Id. at 1176.
133. Id. at 1178.
134. Id. at 1179.
135. Shelby Webb & John D. Harden, Houston ISD Settles with Union over Controversial
Teacher Evaluations, HOUS. CHRON. (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.chron.com/news/
education/article/Houston-ISD-settles-with-union-over-teacher-12267893.php
[https://perma.cc/QS98-NCEK].
136. See Jonathan Manes, Secrecy & Evasion in Police Surveillance Technology, 34
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 503 (2019). See generally Ram, supra note 49.
137. ShotSpotter Technology, SHOTSPOTTER, https://www.shotspotter.com/technology
[https://perma.cc/2W3F-ASNW] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
138. Id.
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proprietary trade secret.139 In one letter, Forbes reported, ShotSpotter’s CEO
emphasized the company’s position that its data “is not crime data”140 at all.
When journalists and researchers began requesting the data from police,
ShotSpotter sent out a “nationwide memo” urging cities not to disclose it.141
ShotSpotter—and some municipalities—took the position that, pursuant to
contract, the data was not a matter of public record.142 As a result,
researchers were limited to analyzing data from the handful of jurisdictions
that released it—over ShotSpotter’s objections—or purchased it directly
from ShotSpotter.143
2. Bail
Proprietary decision-making is also of increasing relevance in criminal
prosecutions. Algorithmic governance is the topic of significant interest in
the context of pretrial release determinations, partially prompted by a
nationwide reckoning with the injustice of cash bail. Over the last several
years, a surge in activism by community bail funds, lawsuits challenging the
constitutionality of money bail,144 and legislative reconsideration of money
bail145 have substantially shifted the conversation about pretrial detention. In
one report, a California working group on pretrial detention reform pointedly

139. Jennifer L. Doleac, Opinion, To Reduce Gun Violence, Empower Citizens to Make
Their Communities Safer, BROOKINGS (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/toreduce-gun-violence-empower-citizens-to-make-their-communities-safer [https://perma.cc/
UUA4-E3ZH].
140. Matt Drange, We’re Spending Millions on This High-Tech System Designed to Reduce
Gun Violence. Is It Making a Difference?, FORBES (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/mattdrange/2016/11/17/shotspotter-struggles-to-prove-impact-as-silicon-valley-answerto-gun-violence [https://perma.cc/8ZJN-A398].
141. Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 13, at 155 n.197.
142. Jason Tashea, Should the Public Have Access to Data Police Acquire Through Private
Companies?, A.B.A. J. (Dec. 1, 2016), www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/public
_access_police_data_private_company [https://perma.cc/5DJ5-BQ7E] (“[B]usiness and
political interests are curtailing the public’s access to the data, which could be used to improve
public safety, police accountability and citizens’ understanding of the nature of crime in their
communities.”).
143. See Jillian B. Carr & Jennifer L. Doleac, The Geography, Incidence, and
Underreporting of Gun Violence: New Evidence Using ShotSpotter Data, BROOKINGS (Apr.
27, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Carr_Doleac_gunfire_
underreporting.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PDA-AA54] (“[D]ata are freely-available to
researchers for only a small subset of ShotSpotter cities . . . . (Note that ShotSpotter is open
to selling the data to researchers.)”).
144. See, e.g., ODonnell v. Harris County, 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018); In re Humphrey,
228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513 (Ct. App. 2018).
145. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:162-15 to 2A:162-26 (West 2020); California Money
Bail Reform Act, S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (enacted); see also James
Brooks, Goodbye Bail: Alaska Switches to New System of Criminal Justice, JUNEAU EMPIRE
(Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.juneauempire.com/news/goodbye-bail-alaska-switches-to-newsystem-of-criminal-justice [https://perma.cc/G7LA-FTDQ]; Tom MacDonald, Philadelphia
Moving
Closer
to
Ending
Cash
Bail,
WHYY
(Oct.
11,
2018),
https://whyy.org/articles/philadelphia-moving-closer-to-ending-cash-bail/
[https://perma.cc/SU5K-Z4GM].
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reminded its readers, “The United States is one of only two countries that
allow for-profit bail bonding; the other is the Philippines.”146
The move toward algorithmic governance builds on a long history of
quantitative, actuarial measures to assess the risk that specific criminal
defendants might pose to society.147 These “actuarial risk assessment
instruments” (ARAIs) have also been deployed in the context of pretrial
release decisions, sentencing, parole, and determinations of sexually violent
predator status, to name a few.148 Contemporary ARAIs hold substantial
promise to reduce overincarceration by making more accurate decisions
about who poses a potential risk to society.149 This need is particularly
pronounced in the contexts of pretrial release and bail: many pretrial
detainees are at low risk of committing violent offenses if they are
released.150 Detaining individuals simply because they cannot afford to pay
bail is unjust, unconstitutional,151 and expensive.152
In light of these realizations, cities, counties, and states are adopting new
decision-making tools—building on the older generation of ARAIs—to help
146. PRETRIAL DET. REFORM WORKGROUP, PRETRIAL DETENTION REFORM:
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE 1, 33 (2017), https://www.courts.ca.gov/
documents/PDRReport-20171023.pdf [https://perma.cc/YWL7-D9KJ].
147. See BERNARD HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND
PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 40–45 (2007) (describing the turn-of-the-century emergence
of actuarial prediction).
148. See, e.g., Ben Green & Yiling Chen, Disparate Interactions: An Algorithm-in-theLoop Analysis of Fairness in Risk Assessments, FAT* ’19 PROC. CONF. ON FAIRNESS,
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY, Jan. 2019, at 90 (describing the use of risk assessment in
criminal justice settings); Douglas Mossman et al., Risky Business Versus Overt Acts: What
Relevance Do ‘Actuarial’, Probabilistic Risk Assessments Have for Judicial Decisions on
Involuntary Psychiatric Hospitalization?, 11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 365, 399 (2011)
(describing use of ARAIs in predicting whether “sexually violent predators” are likely to
reoffend).
149. See Risk Assessment, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, https://www.courtinnovation.org/
areas-of-focus/risk-assessment [https://perma.cc/22WC-TG8N] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020)
(describing how risk assessment might divert individuals from jails). But see Megan
Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103 MINN. L. REV. 303, 341 (2018) (noting
a “sore lack of research” on the success of risk assessment in actually achieving its stated
goals).
150. Anne Milgram et al., Pretrial Risk Assessment: Improving Public Safety and Fairness
in Pretrial Decisionmaking, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 216, 217 (2015) (“In light of the resource
constraints that many justice systems face, it is crucial that jail be used on the highest-risk
individuals, rather than the lower-risk, nonviolent defendants who are often there under our
current system.”).
151. See generally ODonnell v. Harris County, 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018).
152. See, e.g., PATRICK LIU ET AL., THE HAMILTON PROJECT, THE ECONOMICS OF BAIL AND
PRETRIAL
DETENTION
3
(2018),
https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/
BailFineReform_EA_121818_6PM.pdf [ https://perma.cc/KS58-S2Y2] (“Detention is also
costly to society, which bears the direct burden of incarcerating additional people along with
the costs incurred by families, communities, and the labor market.”); see also NATHAN
FENNELL & MEREDITH PRESCOTT, RISK, NOT RESOURCES: IMPROVING THE PRETRIAL RELEASE
PROCESS IN TEXAS 1 (2016), https://lbj.utexas.edu/sites/default/files/file/Risk,%
20Not%20Resources-%20Improving%20the%20Pretrial%20Release%20Process%20in%
20Texas--FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/2E6F-CBRC] (“Texas county jails currently detain
40,300 inmates who are awaiting trial, representing over 62% of the entire jail population of
the state.”).
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determine whether a pretrial detainee actually poses a risk to public safety if
released.153 The new generation of risk assessment tools has been heralded
as providing an “unbiased, objective evaluation of the risks that defendants
pose to society.”154 This focus on objectivity comes as no surprise: social
scientists have long argued that actuarial risk assessment is both more
objective and more accurate than human decision-making.155 Indeed,
actuarial assessments may well be more accurate than “clinical” judgment,
which relies on the “professional judgment of the reviewer” to determine
potential future risk.156 Clinical judgment is “crude and subjective”157 and
prone to human error.158
But state legislatures and court systems that adopt new risk assessment
tools frequently procure them from foundations or the private sector, raising
questions about transparency. The Arnold Foundation, for example, provides
its “Public Safety Assessment” free of charge to jurisdictions that adopt it—
but it compels them to enter into a memorandum of understanding (MOU)
that stipulates that they will not treat the tool like an ordinary public record
for purposes of freedom of information laws.159 Unlike ShotSpotter, the
Arnold Foundation’s MOU expressly indicates that the foundation has no
property interest in the data “provided by” these jurisdictions.160 But the
MOU also provides that the foundation retains “all right, title and interest
(including patents, copyrights, trade secrets and trademarks) in and to the
Tool.”161
3. Evidence
Evidence generated using proprietary methods also occupies a central role
at trial.162 Take, for example, the common use of breathalyzer evidence to
demonstrate that a DUI defendant was, indeed, under the influence. Several
companies manufacture breathalyzers, or “breath test machines,” including

153. Mayson, supra note 59, at 2222 (describing algorithmic risk assessment as the
“linchpin of the bail-reform movement”).
154. Milgram et al., supra note 150, at 219.
155. Id. at 220.
156. James Byrne & April Pattavina, Next Generation Assessment Technology: The
Potential and Pitfalls of Integrating Individual and Community Risk Assessment, 64 PROB. J.
242, 243 (2017).
157. Id.
158. One social science paper demonstrates the dismissive attitude of many toward clinical
judgment, concluding that clinical risk assessments “are often wildly inaccurate and their
rationale opaque.” Berk & Hyatt, supra note 7, at 222.
159. See Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 13; Algorithmic Control: Automated
Decisionmaking in America’s Cities, MUCKROCK, https://www.muckrock.com/project/
uncovering-algorithms-84 [https://perma.cc/263Z-HTL9] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
160. See, e.g., No-Cost Memorandum of Understanding Between Laura and John Arnold
Foundation and County of Santa Clara, Cal. (June 19, 2018) (on file with author).
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Ram, supra note 49; Roth, supra note 27; Wexler, supra note 29; see also
Aurora J. Wilson, Discovery of Breathalyzer Source Code in DUI Prosecutions, 7 WASH. J.L.
TECH. & ARTS 121 (2011).
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Dräger163 (which makes the AlcoTest 9510) and Intoxilyzer.164 Defendants
in dozens of state courts have sought discovery of the source code of these
tools, arguing that expert analysis of the source code is essential to be able to
confront the evidence against them.165 But many courts have concluded that
the prosecution does not “possess” the source code because it is owned by
the private vendor.166
When the vendors have disclosed the source code, it is frequently subject
to an expansive protective order. For instance, Dräger has disclosed source
code in multiple criminal proceedings, pursuant to a protective order.167 But
when two defense experts who had examined the code presented a report
describing its flaws at an annual convention of DUI lawyers in 2017, the
company sent them a cease-and-desist letter, contending that the allegations
were defamatory and violated the order—despite the fact that the report did
not contain any of the source code itself.168 The experts ultimately settled
with Dräger, although some defense attorneys believed the company was
interpreting its protective order too broadly.169
Defendants’ experiences with DNA evidence are equally instructive.
Courts in numerous jurisdictions have admitted DNA analyses generated by
proprietary software, without disclosing the source code to the defendants.170
In New York City, for example, the city’s crime lab—the Office of the Chief
Medical Examiner (OCME)—developed its own probabilistic genotyping
tool, the Forensic Statistical Tool (FST).171 The FST worked by generating
a “likelihood ratio” to estimate the probability that a given contributor’s DNA
was present in a mixed sample.172
163. Breath Alcohol and Drug Testing, DRÄGER, https://www.draeger.com/en-us_us/
Applications/Productselector/Breath-Alcohol-and-Drug-Testing
[https://perma.cc/8QSPEYAF] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
164. See generally CMI INTOXILYZER, https://www.alcoholtest.com/ [https://perma.cc/
PME5-V4D6] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
165. See, e.g., State v. Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d 677 (Minn. 2009); see also Wilson, supra
note 162, at 123 n.3 (collecting cases).
166. Wilson, supra note 162, at 123.
167. See Zack Whittaker, Researchers Say a Breathalyzer Has Flaws, Casting Doubt on
Countless Convictions, ZDNET (May 10, 2018), https://www.zdnet.com/article/draegerBreathalyzer-breath-test-convictions/ [https://perma.cc/K9KK-MERQ].
168. Id. (“Draeger sent the researchers a cease and desist letter claiming defamation and
alleging the two violated a protective order, designed to protect the source code from
leaking.”).
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., People v. Superior Court, B258569, 2015 WL 139069, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App.
Jan. 9, 2015); People v. Rodriguez, 59 N.Y.S.3d 337 (App. Div. 2017); People v. Carter, No.
2573/14, 2016 WL 239708 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 12, 2016); People v. Belle, No. 3955/13, 2015
WL 2131497 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 29, 2015).
171. Lauren Kirchner, Thousands of Criminal Cases in New York Relied on Disputed DNA
Testing Techniques, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 4, 2017), https://www.propublica.org/article/
thousands-of-criminal-cases-in-new-york-relied-on-disputed-dna-testing-techniques
[https://perma.cc/SN2A-DKY3].
172. See generally CATHERINE LEAHY SCOTT, STATE OF N.Y. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GEN., INVESTIGATION INTO THE NEW YORK CITY OFFICE OF CHIEF MEDICAL EXAMINER:
DEPARTMENT OF FORENSIC BIOLOGY (2013), https://ig.ny.gov/sites/g/files/oee571/files/201612/OCMEFinalReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q22W-4XAB].
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Despite the OCME’s extensive use of the FST, the office never disclosed
the source code to a single defendant until Kevin Johnson was prosecuted in
federal court.173 Johnson was arrested in 2015 after an apartment search
turned up two guns. OCME used the FST to analyze the samples of DNA
obtained from the guns, concluding that it was 156 times more likely than
not that one of the guns contained Johnson’s DNA. When Johnson requested
access to the FST source code for expert analysis and review, the government
refused to comply, arguing that the FST was “proprietary and
copyrighted.”174 After a discovery battle, the court concluded that the source
code had to be turned over to the defense expert,175 who reviewed the code
and concluded that its accuracy should be “seriously questioned.”176
Despite the significance of the expert’s conclusions—which cast doubt on
the thousands of cases in which FST evidence had been used—his report
remained under wraps. In order to facilitate discovery, the parties agreed to
a protective order under which the source code was designated as “Highly
Confidential Material.”177 Accordingly, the report was filed on the docket,
but many of its findings remained inaccessible until a nonprofit news outlet,
ProPublica, filed a motion to intervene, vacate the protective order, and
unseal the source code.178 After ProPublica intervened, the city dropped its
claim that the code was proprietary and released it to the reporter, who
published it, prompting a public discussion.179
4. Sentencing
Sentencing proceedings are also being transformed by algorithmic
governance. In a now-infamous case, a defendant raised a due process
challenge to the use at sentencing of a proprietary algorithmic risk assessment
tool called the Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative
Sanctions (COMPAS).180 COMPAS, which was developed by the
173. Kirchner, supra note 171 (writing that the OCME estimated it had used the tool in
over 1300 cases).
174. Letter, United States v. Johnson, No. 15-cr-565 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2016), ECF No. 37.
175. Order, United States v. Johnson, No. 15-cr-565 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 6, 2016), ECF No. 67.
176. Exhibit C at 22, United States v. Johnson, No. 15-cr-565 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2017),
ECF No. 99-5.
177. Protective Order Regarding the Confidentiality of the Forensic Statistical Tool Source
Code and Related Documents, United States v. Johnson, No. 15-cr-565 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 18,
2016), ECF No. 69.
178. Memorandum in Support of Application by ProPublica for Leave to Intervene, Lift
the Protective Order & Unseal Judicial Records, United States v. Johnson, No. 15-cr-565
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2017), ECF No. 139 [hereinafter ProPublica Memorandum].
179. Lauren Kirchner, Federal Judge Unseals New York Crime Lab’s Software for
Analyzing DNA Evidence, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.propublica.org/
article/federal-judge-unseals-new-york-crime-labs-software-for-analyzing-dna-evidence
[https://perma.cc/GD4L-GEA5]. See generally The Source Code, Acquired by ProPublica,
for New York City’s Forensic Statistical Tool, GITHUB, https://github.com/propublica/nycdna-software [https://perma.cc/6E4P-XQRR] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020); The Source Code
for NYC’s Forensic DNA Statistical Analysis Tool, Y COMBINATOR (Oct. 20, 2017), https://
news.ycombinator.com/item?id=15518364 [https://perma.cc/95FN-QVMW].
180. See generally State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016).
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Northpointe Institute for Public Management, is an actuarial risk assessment
tool.181 COMPAS weighs a number of factors, such as criminal history,
education, employment, age, and substance abuse history and generates “risk
scores” intended to predict the likelihood of pretrial recidivism, general
recidivism, and violent recidivism.182
Eric Loomis challenged the use of COMPAS at his sentencing on due
process grounds, analogizing the instrument to a presentence investigation
report that must be disclosed to the defendant.183 But Northpointe
“consider[ed] COMPAS a proprietary instrument and a trade secret” and
contended that its source code could not be disclosed.184 Without access to
information about how the COMPAS tool functions, Loomis argued, its
accuracy was questionable.185
The court took a middle road. Loomis had an “opportunity to verify” that
the inputs into COMPAS—answers to questions about his criminal history,
for example—were accurate.186 But several studies had suggested that the
tool was biased and potentially inaccurate.187 The court held that, because
of these ambiguities about the tool’s accuracy, the sentencing court must be
notified regarding both the proprietary nature of the tool and its potential
inaccuracies.188 One judge wrote in a separate concurrence to clarify,
however, that even taking these limitations into account, it would be
impermissible for the court to “rely” on COMPAS at sentencing; at most,
COMPAS scores could be only “one of many factors” considered.189
Even the most avid supporters of risk assessment are skeptical of the use
of proprietary methods for these purposes; they are concerned that vendors
may not disclose important information or that the profit motive might lead
them to overstate the value of their contributions.190 These concerns about
transparency are coupled with additional substantive questions about how the
tools actually function: for instance, do algorithmic decision-making
mechanisms consider race or gender in ways that might violate the
Constitution or principles of due process? Do evidence-generating tools like

181. Ashley M. Pierson, Validation of the Correctional Offender Management and
Profiling Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS) 3 (July 12, 2018) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Fordham University) (on file with author).
182. Id. at 34 fig.1.
183. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 761.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 762.
186. Id. at 761.
187. Id. at 761–64.
188. Id. at 764 (“Providing information to sentencing courts on the limitations and cautions
attendant with the use of COMPAS risk assessments will enable courts to better assess the
accuracy of the assessment and the appropriate weight to be given to the risk score.”).
189. Id. at 774 (Roggensack, J., concurring).
190. RICHARD BERK, CRIMINAL JUSTICE FORECASTS OF RISK: A MACHINE LEARNING
APPROACH 105 (2012) (“Proprietary software may be purchased easily enough, but important
details may be inadequately disclosed, and performance claims may turn out to be
unsubstantiated; there is usually no equivalent of peer review. It can also be difficult to alter
the software, or require that changes be made by the purveyor, once the project has begun.”).
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breathalyzers malfunction under certain conditions?191 And if so, how will
defendants—or the public—know?
II. ALGORITHMIC OPACITY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
In 2002, Martha Minow wrote that what “American schools, prisons,
welfare agencies, and social service programs have in common” is that they
are the subject of expanding experiments in privatization.192 Seventeen years
later, these seemingly disparate contexts are united not only as sites of
privatization but also as experiments in automation and algorithmic
governance. In important respects, these cases reflect the many ways in
which outsourcing decision-making to the private sector can pose challenges
to existing transparency and accountability mechanisms.193 Partnerships
between government and the private sector in Medicaid, education, and
criminal justice are transforming the way that government makes critical
decisions that affect individual rights as well as the broader public.
A. Concealing Government Decision-Making
First, algorithmic governance amplifies some recurring problems for
procedural due process, with widespread effects. Bureaucracy and red tape
all but ensure that the reasons and procedures for government decisions are
difficult to access even when humans, not machines, are in control.194 But
by automating decision-making and resisting disclosure of its methods,
algorithmic governance poses more entrenched obstacles to litigants’
abilities to “meaningfully challenge” determinations, limiting the types of
information that the government could disclose to affected citizens.195 Thus,
when government defendants assert that their decision-making
methodologies cannot be disclosed because of trade secret concerns, they in
turn attempt to minimize the importance of the methodology—or emphasize
its objectivity—in understanding how the government reached the contested
decision.
In all these cases, by contrast, the courts recognized that due process
requires litigants to have access to some information about the decisionmaking process. But what information specifically? The courts lack a
benchmark for understanding what kinds of information litigants actually
require to make the possibility of a “meaningful challenge” a reality. This
191. Whittaker, supra note 167.
192. Minow, supra note 58, at 1229.
193. Cf. Gillian E. Metzger, Private Delegations, Due Process, and the Duty to Supervise,
in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 291, 299 (Jody
Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009) (observing that, “with expanding privatization, private
entities increasingly are undertaking adjudications on behalf of the government”).
194. Cf. Lens, supra note 61, at 16–19 (describing how both the “social work” and the
“legal” models of determining eligibility for welfare benefits resulted in arbitrary and
discriminatory denials of aid).
195. Michael T. v. Bowling, No. 2:15-CV-09655, 2016 WL 4870284, at *10 (S.D.W. Va.
Sept. 13, 2016), modified sub nom. Michael T. v. Crouch, No. 2:15-CV-09655, 2018 WL
1513295 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 26, 2018).

2020]

ACCESS TO ALGORITHMS

1291

determination may depend partially on the design and intended use of an
algorithmic governance method.196 But some crosscutting questions have
yet to be resolved, including whether individuals should have access to
information about how the methodology functions or only to the data that
constitutes an input into the system.
Accordingly, some courts have suggested that access to the “static factors”
inputted into an automated system is sufficient to vindicate due process
rights. Thus, in State v. Loomis,197 the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the
use of COMPAS in part because the defendant had access to questions and
answers regarding “static factors” such as his criminal history.198 But other
courts have required more, recognizing that access to additional information
about the decision-making process was critical to understanding how the
government reached the outcomes that the plaintiffs wished to challenge.199
And in Houston Federation of Teachers, Local 2145 v. Houston Independent
School District200 (HISD), the court seemed to follow this more demanding
approach, reasoning that access to general information about the EVAAS
methodology was insufficient to alleviate due process concerns.201
In short, these decisions are uniform in holding that the law requires the
disclosure of information necessary to understand whether an automated
decision is accurate but differ in their determinations of what that
information is. In a sense, this observation comports with the courts’ general
embrace of “flexible” procedures that can accommodate different substantive
contexts.202
But if technology and privatization are altering decision-making
methodologies in ways that cut across sectors, perhaps a more coherent and
affirmative approach is needed to determine what kinds of information about
algorithmic systems ought to be disclosed.203 Litigation that is fact-specific,
occurs on a case-by-case basis and ultimately advances the interests of (and
strikes compromises among) private parties may not be the most efficient, or
effective, strategy for advancing algorithmic accountability.
The
“flexibility” of the due process inquiry, in other words, may undermine

196. See, e.g., Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 13, at 120–22 (describing the importance
of understanding the risk of false positives and negatives, particularly in criminal justice
contexts).
197. 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016).
198. Id. at 761.
199. Thus, in Michael T. v. Crouch, the revised approach to determining eligibility for
Medicaid waiver benefits allowed beneficiaries to challenge not only the accuracy of the
inputs but also the application of the decision-making methodology itself. See generally No.
2:15-CV-09655, 2018 WL 1513295 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 26, 2018).
200. 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
201. Id. at 1178.
202. O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 806 (1980).
203. See, e.g., Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 13, at 166 (“Governments should
consciously generate—or demand that their vendors generate—records that will further public
understanding of algorithmic processes.”).
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efforts to shed light on the extent to which decision-making across agencies
is shifting from public toward private governance.204
B. The Role of Human Judgment
These cases also raise significant questions about the role of deference and
human judgment in considering—and potentially reversing—algorithmic
decisions. Courts appear more skeptical of algorithmic determinations when
proprietary tools are accepted and relied upon as the primary or exclusive
factor in decision-making.205 By contrast, courts appear more likely to bless
proprietary algorithmic governance where an algorithmic determination is
only one of many factors to be considered.206
The relationship between human discretion and technological tools is of
central concern because reliance on technology might change the ways in
which decision makers give reasons for their decisions as well as the
outcomes themselves.207 As Danielle Citron has demonstrated, “automation
bias” suggests that “workers will likely adopt a computer’s suggested
eligibility determinations and benefit calculations.”208 These cases tend to
support Citron’s observation, confirming that “fair hearings” are less than
fair when hearing officers defer unthinkingly to algorithmic determinations.
As the HISD court wrote, it “beggars belief that any HISD hearing officer
would (or could) freely disregard the very score used by HISD to identify
‘ineffective’ teachers.”209 Likewise, the court in Michael T. v. Crouch210
found that, despite West Virginia’s “stated policy” to increase benefits
beyond the budget allocated by the APS algorithm, it had “eschew[ed] this
policy in favor of affirming” the outcome of the algorithmic
determination.211
Nonetheless, some studies show more complex interactions between
human decision makers and algorithmic determinations. For instance,
204. See, e.g., Laura A. Dickinson, Privatization and Accountability, 7 ANN. REV. L. &
SOC. SCI. 101 (2011); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 543, 576 (2000) (“[M]any scholars have argued that, in certain contexts, private actors
ought to submit to oversight by agencies, courts, and the legislature, and to be constrained by
the Constitution in the same manner as traditional public agencies are.”); Margaret H. Lemos,
Privatizing Public Litigation, 104 GEO. L.J. 515 (2016) (describing public sector reliance on
private attorneys); Metzger, supra note 58 (analyzing the extent of privatization in
nondelegation terms).
205. See, e.g., State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 769–71 (Wis. 2016) (upholding the use
of proprietary risk assessment because the state’s practices did not give the risk scores “undue
weight”).
206. See, e.g., id. at 772–74 (Roggensack, J., concurring) (supporting the use of algorithmic
determinations in contexts in which decision makers are already required to weigh multiple
factors).
207. See Emily Berman, A Government of Laws and Not of Machines, 98 B.U. L. REV.
1277, 1338 (2018) (arguing that machine learning ought to be deployed in “high-discretion”
environments).
208. Citron, supra note 42, at 1272.
209. HISD, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1180 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
210. No. 2:15-CV-09655, 2018 WL 1513295 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 26, 2018).
211. Id. at *3.
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algorithmic decisions on “human tasks” such as hiring are perceived as less
“fair” and less “trustworthy” than human judgment, suggesting that some
decision makers might ignore or discount them.212 One study of judicial
attitudes toward risk assessment in sentencing found that a minority of judges
believed risk assessment to be more accurate than human judgment.213 In a
recent study of pretrial risk assessment in Kentucky, Megan Stevenson found
that the use of an actuarial risk assessment tool did not markedly increase
efficiency.214 One potential reason, she found, was that “judicial discretion
was used not to correct the risk assessment when it erred, but to override the
risk assessment when it was correct.”215 As one scholar recently predicted
with regard to criminal law enforcement, negative media coverage might also
lead to more public resistance to algorithmic outcomes “since the general
public will inevitably see the failures of predictive algorithms along with
their successes.”216
These factors complicate, rather than clarify, the role of decision-maker
discretion. They make it more difficult to attribute an outcome to a specific
decision maker or process and to understand the basis of government
decisions. One potential result is that the advent of algorithmic decisionmaking—while promising enhanced objectivity and efficiency—actually
introduces more, not less, uncertainty into the logic of governing. This
uncertainty is material not only to the individuals who seek to understand
why they have been denied important rights and benefits but also to the public
as a whole.
C. Process and Results
Perhaps the greatest question raised by these challenges to algorithmic
governance concerns the relationship between process and outcomes.217
Numerous scholars have raised pressing concerns that algorithmic

212. See Min Kyung Lee, Understanding Perception of Algorithmic Decisions: Fairness,
Trust, and Emotion in Response to Algorithmic Management, BIG DATA & SOC’Y, Jan.–June
2018, at 8, 14; see also Mary T. Dzindolet et al., The Role of Trust in Automation Reliance,
58 INT’L J. HUM.-COMPUTER STUD. 697, 697–718 (2003). In one recent study of public sector
users of machine learning technologies outside the United States, some respondents suggested
that a lack of transparency in machine learning could hamper adoption, use, or trust in the
system. Michael Veale, Max Van Kleek & Reuben Binns, Fairness and Accountability Design
Needs for Algorithmic Support in High-Stakes Public Sector Decision-Making, CHI ’18:
PROC. 2018 CHI CONF. HUM. FACTORS COMPUTING SYSTEMS, Apr. 2018, at 1.
213. See generally Jordan M. Hyatt & Steven L. Chanenson, The Use of Risk Assessment
at Sentencing: Implications for Research and Policy (Villanova Pub. Law & Legal Theory,
Working Paper No. 2017-1040, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2961288 [https://perma.cc/
2994-PWKZ].
214. See generally Stevenson, supra note 149.
215. Id. at 369.
216. Simmons, supra note 59, at 1093.
217. See generally Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes—A
Plea for ‘Process Values,’ 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1974) (defending “process values”).
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governance—in the private as well as the public sector—can lead to faulty,
discriminatory, or biased outcomes.218
Notably, however, these successful challenges to proprietary algorithmic
governance in the public sector have not concerned bias or unfairness in the
outcomes of automated processes but rather interests in a fair process. In
several cases, these courts explicitly refused to consider whether an
algorithm itself was “systematically biased.”219 Rather, to the extent that
litigants have been successful in efforts to curb algorithmic decision-making,
these successes are not about degrees of bias or fairness embedded within a
tool. They reflect interests in the kinds of transparency and access that due
process requires. Of course, transparency is also a prerequisite for
understanding whether algorithmic governance indeed offends substantive
rights.
But transparency is as important for reasons of process as for substance.
In fact, these cases may be better viewed through the lens of procedural
values such as transparency, participation, and democratic accountability
than through the lens of discrimination or bias. This is not just because the
resolution of these cases rises or falls on judgments about the quality and
kind of information required to be disclosed to affected parties but rather that
the cases can be seen as advancing procedural justice.220 As scholars of
procedural justice acknowledge, the substantive fairness of government
decision-making matters as much as the appearance of fairness in promoting
public trust and legitimacy.221
As governments adopt automated decision-making systems, they ought to
consider not only the substance of those decisions but also how those
transformations in governance affect public control, trust, and democratic
oversight. This observation comports with the general understanding that
governmental processes ought to be transparent, comprehensible, and
predictable.222 The interests in “predictability, transparency, and rationality”
218. See, e.g., Rachel Courtland, Bias Detectives: The Researchers Striving to Make
Algorithms Fair, NATURE (June 20, 2018), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-01805469-3 [https://perma.cc/AW8W-RW3H]; see also Barocas & Selbst, supra note 28; Citron,
supra note 42; Citron & Pasquale, supra note 29; Huq, supra note 59; Katyal, supra note 38;
Mayson, supra note 59; Starr, supra note 59.
219. HISD, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1180 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (dismissing the plaintiffs’
substantive due process argument that EVAAS was not “rational” because it was
“systematically biased”); see also State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 764 (Wis. 2016)
(endorsing “cautions” on the use of risk assessment without explicitly finding that the tools
encoded bias).
220. See generally Tom R. Tyler, What Is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens
to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103 (1988).
221. Tracey L. Meares & Tom R. Tyler, Justice Sotomayor and the Jurisprudence of
Procedural Justice, 123 YALE L.J. FORUM 525, 535 (2014) (“Many judges devote their
attention to being fair, i.e., to correctly applying the law to the facts of each case, but do not
think about how they can communicate that they are being fair to the parties in the case or to
the public more generally.”).
222. See Mashaw, supra note 18; Redish & Marshall, supra note 18; Saphire, supra note
18, at 116 (“A purely piecemeal, incremental definition of fairness would be at odds with the
view that fairness can or should have some guiding influence on the way in which persons or
institutions should be expected to act.”).
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are not only essential for vindicating individuals’ interest in understanding
the legal rules that bind them but also for informing society about the laws
that exist and how they are applied.223
III. ACCESS LAW FOR AN OPAQUE AGE
Challenges to algorithmic decision-making teach a valuable lesson:
knowledge is power. In efforts to confront algorithmic decision-making, the
first step is nearly always an arduous journey to shed light on why, and how,
the decision was reached in the first instance. Even within a traditional
procedural due process framework, litigants have repeatedly raised issues
regarding transparency of government decision-making that affect the
public.224
New challenges to transparency and accountability also resonate within
the broader framework of the law of access to government proceedings and
records, which is preoccupied with opening government decision-making to
public view. This Article now turns toward the law of access itself to
examine how the guarantees of public records statutes and the constitutional
right of access to government proceedings might advance efforts to bring
algorithmic governance into public view. Critically, neither mechanism
provides clear solutions to the challenge of proprietary algorithmic
governance. Nonetheless, both sources call into question the adoption of
proprietary tools to shield government decision-making from public view.225
A. Why Access Law?
These cases raise a conceptual question: when ought the methodology of
government decision-making be public? This question has deep practical
implications. If the processes for government decision-making were already
public, litigants would not have to fight tooth and nail to gain access to an
explanation of why their benefits were slashed, their employment was
terminated, or their release from prison was delayed.
The challenges to algorithmic opacity surveyed in the preceding sections
are efforts to facilitate access to information critical to individuals affected
by algorithmic governance. In light of these modest successes for the
interests of algorithmic justice, what more could the law of access add?
The law of access makes a critical contribution in shifting the burden to
force disclosure from those who are directly affected to the general public.
To date, most of the challenges to algorithmic opacity have been brought by

223. Redish & Marshall, supra note 18, at 485.
224. See supra Part I.A (describing the Idaho plaintiffs’ rejection of a protective order);
supra Part I.B (describing the HISD protective order).
225. See, e.g., DIAKOPOULOS, supra note 33, at 12.
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litigants who are typically underresourced: criminal defendants,226 the poor
and disabled,227 and public servants.228
Nowhere is this dynamic more obvious than in the context of Medicaid
waiver determinations. Although these cases have received hardly any
scholarly attention,229 they have deep significance for the study of
algorithmic governance. The Medicaid cases reflect how algorithmic
governance often affects the least privileged, least empowered members of
society, who are often represented by overstretched and underresourced legal
aid organizations: in this case, the disabled.
Yet implicit in these cases is an acknowledgment that this information also
has broader implications for the public’s right to know. In K.W. ex rel. D.W.
v. Armstrong,230 that claim was made explicit: the decision-making
methodology had to be disclosed not only to the plaintiffs but also to any
other interested person using the mechanism of Idaho’s public records law.
The reasons are clear: although there were only a few plaintiffs, the
methodology should be available to all beneficiaries and their guardians,
regardless of whether they were represented in the case. Moreover, K.W.
reflects a broader understanding: in all of these cases, even if individual
litigants had sufficient information to challenge the individual determinations
that affected their rights, the public would still be largely in the dark.
This public interest in understanding how proprietary algorithmic
governance works is precisely what is protected by laws requiring public
access to government records and proceedings. This interest is independent
from that of the litigants. Indeed, in many cases seeking to vindicate the right
of access to government proceedings, the public intervenes in an ongoing
case notwithstanding the opposition of both parties.231 Under open records

226. See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari & Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma
Pauperis, Loomis v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (mem.) (No. 16-6387) (establishing
that Loomis was represented by pro bono counsel Michael D. Rosenberg of Community
Justice, Inc.).
227. See, e.g., K.W. ex rel. D.W. v. Armstrong, 789 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2015); Michael T.
v. Bowling, No. 2:15-CV-09655, 2016 WL 4870284, at *2 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 13, 2016),
modified sub nom. Michael T. v. Crouch, No. 2:15-CV-09655, 2018 WL 1513295 (S.D.W.
Va. Mar. 26, 2018); see also Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Ledgerwood, 530 S.W.3d 336, 345
(Ark. 2017) (holding that the Arkansas Department of Human Services violated the state’s
Administrative Procedure Act by failing to provide Medicaid waiver recipients with notice of
new automated methodology for benefits determinations).
228. See generally HISD, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
229. Only a handful of scholarly sources discuss these cases. See, e.g., Kate Crawford &
Jason Schultz, AI Systems as State Actors, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1941, 1948–52 (2019);
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, A Common Law for the Age of Artificial Intelligence:
Incremental Adjudication, Institutions, and Relational Non-Arbitrariness, 119 COLUM. L.
REV. 1773, 1784 n.31 (2019).
230. 789 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2015).
231. See, e.g., United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[A] motion to
intervene to assert the public’s First Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings is
proper.” (emphasis added)); United States v. Soussoudis (In re Wash. Post Co.), 807 F.2d 383,
386–87 (4th Cir. 1986) (permitting the Washington Post to intervene for purposes of
challenging the closure of a sentencing hearing to which defendant had not objected); United
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statutes, transparency advocates frequently seek records that implicate
individual privacy rights.232 This public-oriented framework acknowledges
that, at times, the public’s interests in transparency and openness may
contradict the preferences of the parties in litigation.
This disjunction between the interests of private litigants and the public
interest has practical roots. Private litigants often lack a reason to push for
public disclosure of records concerning algorithmic decision-making.
Sometimes secrecy redounds to a litigant’s benefit by protecting key privacy
interests.233 In the criminal context, pushing for public disclosure might
heighten the possibility that others would learn of a criminal proceeding, thus
creating more significant collateral consequences by tipping off future
employers, landlords, or business associates or by revealing cooperation with
law enforcement investigations.234 In the civil context, pushing for public
disclosure also runs counter to statutes that protect individual medical
privacy or that shield against disclosure of employment records.235
More important, as a normative matter, individual litigants should not have
to shoulder the burden of ensuring that algorithmic governance comports
with constitutional and statutory requirements vis-à-vis the public. Litigating
these issues requires time and money that many litigants do not have.
Nonetheless, asserting the public interest in transparency is not to diminish
the importance and the value of individual challenges to opacity. As Frank
Michelman has described it in a different context, these two perspectives are
neither “mutually exclusive [nor] competitive” but rather give a “binocular
view” of algorithmic transparency.236 As this Article describes below,
transparency’s legal mechanisms can meaningfully contribute to the project
of algorithmic transparency along a parallel track without undermining or
jeopardizing the due process arguments presented in the cases surveyed
above.

States v. Carpentier, 526 F. Supp. 292, 293 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (permitting the New York Times
to intervene and unseal evidence even though the defendant had not moved to unseal).
232. See generally U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489
U.S. 749 (1989).
233. See Amanda Conley et al., Sustaining Privacy and Open Justice in the Transition to
Online Court Records: A Multidisciplinary Inquiry, 71 MD. L. REV. 772, 783–84 (2012)
(noting that court dockets create durable, persistent records of individuals’ involvement with
the criminal justice system).
234. Id. at 784; see also D. Brock Hornby, Can Federal Sentencing Remain Transparent?,
JUDICATURE, Spring 2019, at 46 (describing efforts to conceal sentencing memoranda that
would reveal a defendant’s cooperation with law enforcement).
235. See, e.g., Al Baker & Benjamin Mueller, Records Leak in Eric Garner Case Renews
Debate on Police Discipline, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/
22/nyregion/nypd-eric-garner-daniel-pantaleo-disciplinary-records.html
[https://perma.cc/
RAX8-QDTF] (describing the conflict between confidentiality of police records and the New
York open records statute); see also State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Daniels, 844 N.E.2d
1181, 1187 (Ohio 2006) (addressing the conflict between the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act and Ohio’s public records statute).
236. Frank I. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in
DUE PROCESS: NOMOS XVIII 126, 131 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1977).
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B. Transparency’s Statute: FOIA
Might FOIA or its state equivalents directly constrain the use of
proprietary algorithmic governance? Efforts to leverage the guarantees of
open records litigation in support of algorithmic transparency confront
several doctrinal hurdles. Although FOIA’s requirements are intended to
open government decision-making to public view, the law does not, itself,
impose obstacles to the use of private decision-making authority.237 Instead,
it creates an administrative process for a member of the public to request
government records and confers federal jurisdiction on district courts, which
can enjoin agencies from withholding records or order them to produce
records which have been “improperly withheld.”238
But the interests protected by FOIA and its state counterparts—enhancing
“public knowledge of Government operations”239—suggest some limits on
the government’s use of proprietary, secret decision-making methods. The
extensive body of FOIA case law emphasizes the necessity of understanding
both the mechanisms and outcomes of decision-making. Moreover, the
broad principles of open government embodied in FOIA suggest that
shielding government decisions by using proprietary means is inappropriate.
Congress enacted FOIA in response to an administrative state that had
become increasingly secretive.240 The purpose of the statute was to “pierce
the veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light of
public scrutiny.”241 The statutory structure reflects its purpose, allowing
“any person” to submit a request for agency records and requiring agencies
to respond—unless the material falls within one of nine enumerated
exemptions.242 In addition, FOIA requires agencies to affirmatively publish
several categories of rules, procedures, and statements of policy, either in the
Federal Register or in electronic “reading rooms.”243 In contrast to the legacy

237. See Paul R. Verkuil, Outsourcing and the Duty to Govern, in GOVERNMENT BY
CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 193, at 310, 316–17
(contending that FOIA’s transparency obligations, while not imposing substantive obstacles,
would “help condition the President’s transfer of civilian policymaking authority to private
hands”).
238. See Kenneth Culp Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L.
REV. 761, 767 (1967) (“The court has jurisdiction to enforce; it is not commanded to
enforce.”).
239. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 156 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
240. See generally Kwoka, Deferring to Secrecy, supra note 21, at 197; see also EPA v.
Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973) (explaining how, prior to FOIA’s enactment, section 3 of the
Administrative Procedure Act had come to be “looked upon more as a withholding statute
than a disclosure statute”).
241. Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (quoting Rose v. Dep’t of
the Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 263 (2d Cir. 1974)).
242. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)–(9) (2018) (enumerating nine exceptions); see also Pozen, supra
note 43, at 1103–04 (describing the statutory scheme).
243. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2); see also Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, 846 F.3d 1235, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (describing § 552(a)(2) as the “readingroom provision”).
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of administrative secrecy, FOIA instead embraced a philosophy of
“maximum access.”244
An initial obstacle to efforts to promote algorithmic transparency concerns
FOIA’s limitation that it applies only to those records which an agency
“controls.”245 To determine whether an agency “controls” a record, courts
apply a multifactor test that examines the intent of the creator, the agency’s
ability to “use and dispose of” the record, and its use and integration of the
document within its own system.246 The “decisive factor” in establishing
whether a document is a government record is whether an agency has used,
read, or relied upon it, because only if it has done so would disclosure
vindicate FOIA’s fundamental values by helping the public learn about
government decision-making.247
FOIA’s “control” requirement reflects its goal of shedding light on records
that actually reflect government decision-making.248 This statutory purpose
suggests that when agencies adopt and rely upon proprietary materials or
software in making decisions, those materials should generally be considered
matters of public record—regardless of the licensing or contractual
Indeed, allowing contracts between the
provisions that govern.249
government and its vendors to remove the infrastructure of decision-making
from public control reflects a formalistic approach that privileges the private
sector’s economic and political power while virtually eviscerating the
purposes of the statutory protections.250 As Justice William J. Brennan put
it in a scathing dissent in 1980, secret governance is equally “destructive of
democracy” regardless of the formal contractual means by which it is
accomplished.251
While courts have rarely had the opportunity to consider FOIA requests
for proprietary records that are at the core of the government’s decisionmaking functions, the emergence of algorithmic governance puts this balance
to the test. But courts ought to look askance at efforts to hamper public access
in ways that would permit the government “to insulate itself from public
scrutiny of its operations and regulatory decisions.”252 Where governments
244. Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
245. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 146 (1989).
246. Burka v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 87 F.3d 508, 515 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
247. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 646 F.3d 924, 927 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(quoting Consumer Fed’n of Am. v. Dep’t of Agric., 455 F.3d 283, 288 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
248. See Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976) (describing the “basic
purpose of the Freedom of Information Act ‘to open agency action to the light of public
scrutiny’” (quoting Rose v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 263 (2d Cir. 1974))).
249. See Tax Analysts v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 913 F. Supp. 599, 607 (D.D.C. 1996), aff’d
sub nom. Tax Analysts v. Dep’t of Justice, 107 F.3d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
250. See Pozen, supra note 43, at 1114 (describing the private sector’s “privileged position”
under FOIA).
251. Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 190 n.8 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Certainly
the agency cannot control the legal consequences simply by the label it attaches to a
relationship.”).
252. Tax Analysts, 913 F. Supp. at 607. In Tax Analysts, the district court ruled that JURIS,
an electronic legal research database, was not an “agency record” subject to the FOIA. Id.
West, a legal publisher, had entered into a contract with the Department of Justice through
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adopt proprietary decision-making methodologies that impact their
“structure, operation, or decision-making procedures,” those records ought
to become public.253 In other words, although not every item that the
government procures or licenses from the private sector becomes a “public
record,” those that are at the core of the government’s decision-making
functions—the transparency of which is the primary interest protected by
FOIA—are likely to be covered by the statute’s disclosure regime.
1. Exemption 4
Even assuming that the records are controlled by an agency, however,
FOIA’s exemptions may also impede efforts to obtain access to proprietary
decision-making tools. FOIA’s “Exemption 4” provides that “trade secrets
and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and
privileged or confidential” are exempt from disclosure.254 For example,
courts have denied FOIA requests for proprietary videoconferencing
software, reasoning that even assuming the records were “agency records,”
they would be protected under Exemption 4.255
Like the control requirement, FOIA’s broad exemption for trade secrets
and confidential business information was intended to stimulate information
sharing with the government, not to shield government decision-making from
public scrutiny. The statute’s legislative history confirms that the exemption
was meant to protect “information which is obtained by the government
through questionnaires or other inquiries, but which would customarily not
be released to the public by the person from whom it was obtained.”256
Congress anticipated that information such as “business sales statistics,
inventories, customer lists, and manufacturing processes” submitted to an
agency would be kept confidential.257
But Exemption 4’s protections extend beyond trade secrets to protect
confidential commercial information as well. In an influential 1974 decision,
the D.C. Circuit held that, in order to satisfy the requirements of Exemption
4, courts must not only determine whether information is “confidential” but
also that “non-disclosure is justified by the legislative purpose which
underlies the exemption.”258 Under this approach, Exemption 4 recognizes
that information can be withheld if disclosure is likely “(1) to impair the
Government’s ability to obtain necessary information in the future; or (2) to

which it licensed the database for internal use, subject to a provision that protected West’s
“proprietary rights.” Id. at 603–04. The district court found that the database was not under
the department’s “control,” reasoning that disclosure would not serve the broader values of
FOIA. Id. at 607.
253. Id. at 607; see also SDC Dev. Corp. v. Mathews, 542 F.2d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 1976).
254. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2018).
255. Gilmore v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 4 F. Supp. 2d 912, 922 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
256. 111 CONG. REC. 26,823 (1965).
257. Id.
258. Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the person from whom
the information was obtained.”259
In June 2019, however, the U.S. Supreme Court found the “substantial
competitive harm” requirement “inconsistent with the terms of the
statute.”260 Instead, the Court reasoned that, in order to shield commercial
or proprietary information from disclosure, FOIA required only that the
owner of that information “customarily and actually” treat it as secret and
that the government promise to keep the information secret as well.261 The
result is to expand the scope of plausible Exemption 4 claims.262
Agencies may be even less likely to comply with FOIA requests when they
expect that a vendor or contractor would not want to comply. Agencies
normally notify government contractors when information that may be
confidential is sought under FOIA.263 Those who submit confidential
information to the government can file a “reverse FOIA” suit seeking to
enjoin an agency from releasing that information.264 As one commentator
has observed, “even the threat of a reverse-FOIA action creates an
environment where agencies are more likely to work with contractors” to
prevent disclosure.265
Nonetheless, there is some room for optimism that Exemption 4 might not
shield the methodologies of government decision-making from disclosure.
First, there is little evidence that Exemption 4 was intended to cover decisionmaking methodologies employed by the government in making
determinations about constitutional rights. Although the federal courts have
repeatedly held that even organizations that are delegated fairly extensive
authority by the executive branch are not subject to FOIA,266 that conclusion
is questionable where those organizations make determinations about
constitutional rights. Although the government does have an interest in
ensuring the “continued availability” of information and materials that are

259. Id. at 770 (footnote omitted).
260. Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2361 (2019).
261. Id. at 2366.
262. Id. at 2368 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[G]iven the
temptation, common across the private and public sectors, to regard as secret all information
that need not be disclosed, I fear the majority’s reading will deprive the public of information
for reasons no better than convenience, skittishness, or bureaucratic inertia.”); see also Tom
Susman & Lisa Rosenberg, Will Corporations Decide What Information the Public Gets?,
HILL (June 3, 2019, 5:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/446699-willcorporations-decide-what-information-the-public-gets [https://perma.cc/H8HR-J2ZH].
263. 29 C.F.R. § 1610.19 (2019) (requiring predisclosure notification concerning
confidential commercial information).
264. Honeywell Tech. Sols., Inc. v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 779 F. Supp. 2d 14, 16 (D.D.C.
2011).
265. Nooree Lee, How Do States Safeguard Contractor Proprietary Information?,
PROCUREMENT L., Summer 2013, at 11, 11.
266. See, e.g., Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 171 (1980) (holding that “written data
generated, owned, and possessed by a privately controlled organization receiving federal study
grants are not ‘agency records’” under FOIA); see also Guttman, supra note 58.

1302

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

voluntarily provided to it by the private sector, this does not suggest that the
private sector should be able to condition its services on confidentiality.267
2. Exemption 5
FOIA’s “Exemption 5” may also pose a hurdle to disclosure of proprietary
decision-making software. FOIA exempts from disclosure information that
is subject to the deliberative process privilege.268 This exemption is intended
to protect the integrity of the formulation of government decisions and policy
by shielding them from outside interference and scrutiny.269 Facts are not
exempt; only those materials that would “expose the deliberative process”
can be withheld.270 And because the privilege only protects “predecisional”
material, it cannot be asserted after an agency accepts or relies upon it.271
No court has upheld a claim that automated decision systems should be
considered “deliberative.” Indeed, many automated decision systems are
likely to contain more unprivileged “facts” than privileged “deliberation.”272
And acceptance of a decision made by an automated tool would extinguish
any privilege in any event.273
In a 2006 case, the attorney general of Massachusetts sought access to EPA
records related to the use of a “proprietary computerized model . . . to prepare
forecasts utilized in evaluating the relative costs and benefits of alternative
proposed regulatory approaches to pollution control.”274 The court rejected
EPA’s invocation of the deliberative process exemption, reasoning that the
model was essentially an “investigative technique utilized to generate raw
data.”275 While the data undoubtedly would reflect, to some extent, the
agency’s thought process, the court went on, “This is true of any investigation
by which an agency seeks facts—knowing what questions are asked or which
witnesses are interviewed reveals aspects of what the investigator deemed
important or worthy of consideration.”276
Nonetheless, this reasoning has not stopped government agencies from
claiming that the deliberative process exemption shields reasoning that was
aided or developed by automated means. In one recent case under Illinois’s
Freedom of Information Act, a newspaper sought access to records related to
267. See Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 975 F.2d 871, 878
(D.C. Cir. 1992). Some state courts have also explicitly rejected governments’ efforts to shield
themselves from liability under state open records acts by outsourcing responsibility to private
contractors. See generally WIREdata, Inc. v. Village of Sussex, 751 N.W.2d 736 (Wis. 2008).
268. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2018).
269. See Grand Cent. P’ship, Inc. v. Cuomo, 166 F.3d 473, 482 (2d Cir. 2009).
270. Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 575 F.2d 932, 934 (D.C. Cir.
1978).
271. Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 697 F.3d
184, 205 (2d Cir. 2012); Am. Soc’y of Pension Actuaries v. IRS, 746 F. Supp. 188, 190–91
(D.D.C. 1990).
272. Mead Data Cent., 575 F.2d at 935.
273. Brennan Ctr., 697 F.3d at 200.
274. Reilly v. EPA, 429 F. Supp. 2d 335, 338 (D. Mass. 2006).
275. Id. at 352–53.
276. Id. at 352.
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the Cook County Assessor’s Office’s methodology for valuing property for
the purposes of assessing property taxes.277 The methodology involved using
a computerized regression model to compare properties to other similar
properties, after which analysts examined the results, made adjustments, and
finalized the values. The court rejected the office’s invocation of the
deliberative process exemption, recognizing that the requested records were
“not ones in which opinions are expressed or in which policies or actions are
formulated—they are factual.”278
Although open records laws have gone fairly untested as means to compel
the disclosure of proprietary decision-making tools used by government, they
call into question the legitimacy of government contracts that require secrecy
in decision-making. It is axiomatic that public records laws ought to be
“liberally construed” to promote public access to government records.279
Some state open records laws explicitly prevent the government from
entering into contracts that would “impair[] the right of the public” to access
public records.280 Other state courts have simply found that certain secret
actions taken by government are inconsistent with state open records laws.281
As such, public records laws provide critical support for opponents of
algorithmic opacity.
C. Transparency’s Constitution: The First Amendment
The First Amendment is equally hostile to secret government decisionmaking.282 This hostility stems, in part, from a central observation of First
Amendment theory that an inextricable link binds together democracy, selfgovernance, and free expression.283 The understanding that free expression
277. Chi. Tribune Co. v. Cook Cty. Assessor’s Office, 109 N.E.3d 872, 875 (Ill. App. Ct.
2008).
278. Id. at 879.
279. See, e.g., Chambers v. Birmingham News Co., 552 So. 2d 854, 856 (Ala. 1989)
(“Statutes intended for the public benefit are to be construed in favor of the public.”); Quality
Towing, Inc. v. City of Myrtle Beach, 547 S.E.2d 862, 864–65 (S.C. 2001); Doe ex rel. Roe
v. Wash. State Patrol, 374 P.3d 63, 66 (Wash. 2016).
280. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-211(b) (2020); see also Office of Health Care Access v.
Freedom of Info. Comm’n, No. CV030521573S, 2005 WL 1095361, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Apr. 19, 2005) (upholding the decision that the agency violated Connecticut’s FOIA by
acquiring a new computer system from a contractor that impeded compliance with public
records requests).
281. See, e.g., S-P Drug Co. v. Smith, 409 N.Y.S.2d 161, 164–65 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (“The
State cannot evade the obligations of the law by agreeing not to disclose the drug price data
and documentation, requiring any interested member of the public to purchase that information
from a private party at a price.”).
282. Heidi Kitrosser, Supremely Opaque?:
Accountability, Transparency, and
Presidential Supremacy, 5 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 62, 62 (2010); see also Heidi
Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege Revisited, 92 IOWA L. REV.
489, 494 (2007); David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 257 (2010).
283. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 26
(1960); see also Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 20 (1971) (“Constitutional protection should be accorded only to speech that is
explicitly political.”); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP.
CT. REV. 245, 254.
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is “indispensable to the operation of a democratic form of government” is at
the heart of several accounts of the “meaning” of the First Amendment.284
And while many theorists would extend the meaning of the First Amendment
much farther, at a minimum, the “political speech” that lies at the core of
First Amendment interests would appear to include speech regarding
government decision-making.285 These interests cut against secretive
government proceedings that cannot be monitored or scrutinized by the press
or public.
Reflecting the prevailing view that information about government
decision-making is critical both to democracy and to public debate, the
Supreme Court has recognized that the public has a constitutional right of
access to government proceedings and records rooted in the First
Amendment.286 In 1978, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized “a general
right to inspect and copy public records and documents” under common
law.287 In 1979, the Supreme Court—while holding that the Sixth
Amendment did not guarantee a public right of access to criminal trials—
indicated that there might be a right of access to criminal trials couched in
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.288 In following years, the Court
broadened its interpretation, finding that the public must be able to attend a
variety of criminal proceedings—including trials,289 voir dire,290 and
preliminary hearings.291
In its 1980 opinion in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,292 the Court
explicitly linked the right to attend criminal trials to broader First
Amendment values, reasoning that, “without the freedom to attend such
trials, which people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of
freedom of speech and ‘of the press could be eviscerated.’”293 And in his
influential concurring opinion, Justice Brennan also emphasized the
functional importance of the right of access, identifying open government
proceedings as a critical feature of the First Amendment’s “structural
role . . . in securing and fostering our republican system of selfgovernment.”294

284. Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the
Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 309 (1978); Thomas I. Emerson,
Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 883 (1963).
285. See generally Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of
Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2004); Kenneth L.
Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20 (1975);
Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982).
286. See Bloch-Wehba, supra note 44, at 153–58 (canvassing the right of access case law).
287. Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).
288. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 391–92 (1979).
289. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
290. See, e.g., Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
291. See, e.g., Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 2
(1986).
292. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
293. Id. at 580 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)).
294. Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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The First Amendment right of access to government proceedings requires
that preliminary criminal hearings be held in open court.295 Press-Enterprise
Co. v. Superior Court296 (Press-Enterprise II) set forth a two-pronged test
for determining whether the public must have access to a given proceeding
and held that a court considering an access claim must assess both “whether
public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the
particular process in question” and “whether the place and process have
historically been open to the press and general public.”297 If the First
Amendment right attaches, proponents of closure must meet a demanding
standard.298
Importantly for the enterprise of algorithmic risk assessment, PressEnterprise II and its progeny established a presumption of openness
regarding bail hearings. Numerous courts have recognized that the
functional benefits of public access, which serves as “a check on judicial
conduct and tends to improve the performance both of the parties and of the
judiciary,” are as apparent in pretrial release proceedings as in other judicial
proceedings.299 Perhaps even more so: “The decision to hold a person
presumed innocent of any crime without bail is one of major importance to
the administration of justice,” and the community is “directly affected” by
these decisions.300
By the same token, the press and the public have a constitutional right to
attend sentencing and have access to sentencing-related documents. This
right is integrally related to the court’s duties in sentencing, which are
independent from those of the jury.301 At sentencing, public access is
particularly important because it “operates to check any temptation that
might be felt by either the prosecutor or the court to obtain a guilty plea by
coercion or trick, or to seek or impose an arbitrary or disproportionate
sentence.”302 Likewise, sentencing is socially significant to numerous
audiences: to “friends and family members of the defendant being
sentenced,” to “victims of crimes, to family members of victims, and to
members of the community in which the crime occurred.”303 Sentencing is
also a particularly “solemn occasion at which the judge has the weighty duty
of determining the fate of another human being.”304 These perspectives have
295. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S at 10.
296. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
297. Id. at 8.
298. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984) (“The presumption of openness may be
overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve
higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”).
299. United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 363–64 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing United States
v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 556 (3d Cir. 1982)).
300. Seattle Times Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 845 F.2d 1513, 1516–17 (9th Cir. 1988).
301. United States v. Carpentier, 526 F. Supp. 292, 295 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (“In sentencing,
unlike other aspects of criminal proceedings, it is the distinct province of the court to determine
what constitutes proper sentence.”).
302. United States v. Soussoudis (In re Wash. Post Co.), 807 F.2d 383, 389 (4th Cir. 1986).
303. United States v. Alcantara, 396 F.3d 189, 198 (2d Cir. 2005).
304. Id. at 199.
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remained part of the logic of holding open sentencing hearings despite the
increasingly transactional nature of sentencing, which today includes
“precious little discussion of the human qualities of the victim or the
defendant, of the inherently unquantifiable moral aspects of the defendant’s
crime, or of the type of sanction that would best achieve any of the purposes
of sentencing.”305
The First Amendment interests in open government proceedings suggest
that proprietary algorithmic governance mechanisms may violate the
Constitution. As one commentator has put it, “once a computerized
algorithm is used by the government, constitutional rights may attach.”306
When the government relies upon an automated decision system to generate
evidence at trial, to set bail, or to determine a sentence, the public’s First
Amendment rights demand that those proceedings be held in an open and
transparent manner. By shielding the methodology of decision-making from
public view, the government undermines critical assumptions of the First
Amendment.
IV. TRANSPARENCY REMEDIES FOR ALGORITHMIC OPACITY
Time and again, litigants directly confront black box procedures that result
from the outsourcing or privatization of government decision-making. This
opacity often flouts constitutional or statutory requirements of openness. In
short, these challenges can be understood as efforts to obtain access to key
information needed to understand government decisions that affect people
directly.
Reframing algorithmic decision-making as reflecting a public interest in
disclosure, rather than a purely private interest in due process, brings to the
fore a central dynamic. When courts find that the Constitution or a statute
requires the disclosure of how the government reaches its decisions, we
should understand that that requirement is not a relic of procedural due
process alone. Rather, it reflects fundamental values of open government
that are codified in the Freedom of Information Act, its state equivalents, and
the First Amendment. Those mechanisms—the fabric of the law of access—
are hostile to privatized, proprietary decision-making.
Viewing algorithmic governance through the lens of access law introduces
a new perspective into the discussion of accountability and transparency for
automated decision systems. Not only should algorithmic governance be
accountable to those whom it affects, it should also satisfy, or at least not
violate, fundamental values of open government that are core to our
democratic system. These values cast doubt on the viability of the
frameworks that have developed to limit the flow of critical information
about algorithmic governance.

305. KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS 85 (1998).
306. See Eidelman, supra note 52, at 918.
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A. Secrecy by Contract
At bottom, the transparency problem raised by algorithmic governance as
it is presented today results largely from procurement practices that fail to
foreground the public interest. As Catherine Crump has documented, this
problem is particularly pronounced in the context of criminal law
enforcement and surveillance.307 State and local government agencies
seeking to secretly procure surveillance technologies can often either face a
lack of awareness and interest by legislative officials or avoid legislative
oversight entirely.308
From the perspective of intellectual property law, the dueling interests
between vendors’ trade secrecy claims and plaintiffs’ challenges seem
unremarkable.309 But from the perspective of procurement law, this need not
be so. States differ widely with regard to how public contracts should treat
intellectual property rights. Some states generally treat these contracts as
conferring licenses upon state actors, while others, by default, allocate full
ownership of intellectual property to the state.310 Some have criticized this
allocation of intellectual property ownership to the state, writing that
conveying such ownership to a public purchaser simply is not necessary for
“the efficient and cost-effective delivery of supplies and services.”311 In the
mine-run of cases, this observation is likely correct.
But where intellectual property rights are likely to clash with governments’
obligations under transparency laws, perhaps different contract terms should
be anticipated.312 Procurement law anticipates a distinction between items
that are used for “governmental purposes” and those that are not.313 Surely,
the allocation of government benefits and decisions regarding critical civil
rights and liberties are “governmental purposes.” This suggests that these
tools are not generally “commercial” systems.314 Indeed, many vendors of
automated decision systems have government agencies as their primary, or
sole, customer base.
307.
308.
309.
310.

See generally Crump, supra note 44.
Id. at 1617.
See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 38.
See generally RICHARD PENNINGTON, COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF STATE IT
PROCUREMENT PRACTICES (2010), https://www.naspo.org/dnn/portals/16/documents/
NASPO_IT_Procurement_Whitepaperfinal2.pdf [https://perma.cc/YAV5-4B2S].
311. See Transforming Procurement for the 21st Century, IJIS INST. 10 (Mar. 2009),
https://www.ijis.org/resource/collection/58A7EE9C-2F96-4E73-8D02-4BA3C9ED76DD/
proc_abstct_transforming_procurement_21st_century.pdf [https://perma.cc/RUA5-KN4S].
312. Cf. Woodrow Hartzog, Body Cameras and the Path to Redeem Privacy Law, 96 N.C.
L. REV. 1257, 1259 (2018) (describing how, in the absence of rules about body camera use,
police agencies and commercial vendors were left to “come up with their own rules”); Peter
Swire & Jesse Woo, Privacy and Cybersecurity Lessons at the Intersection of the Internet of
Things and Police Body-Worn Cameras, 96 N.C. L. REV. 101, 139 (2018) (stressing the
“importance of the contractual terms when police departments procure [body-worn cameras]
and related services”).
313. Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (2019) (defining “commercial”
items as items that are “of a type customarily used by the general public or by nongovernmental entities for purposes other than governmental purposes”).
314. Id.
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Acting as consumers, governments can therefore require more demanding
contract terms that bring their procurement processes into alignment with due
process and transparency requirements. A draft bill recently introduced by
the Washington State Legislature exemplifies this approach.315 The draft bill
requires that automated decision systems have several transparency and
accountability-enhancing features, including that they be open to audit and
inspection by state agencies and third parties and that they be capable of
giving intelligible explanations for the decisions they reach.316 In terms of
procurement, the Washington bill also requires that procurement contracts
for automated decision systems cannot contain nondisclosure provisions or
other obstacles to transparency.317 Washington’s approach provides sound
guidance for other jurisdictions to follow in reforming their procurement
policies for algorithmic governance.
B. Transparency for Me, but Not for Thee
In an atmosphere of increasing automation and privatization, these cases
pit proprietary interests in trade secrecy against individual interests in
transparency. Faced with demands for more transparency, courts and
litigants have sometimes reached an apparent compromise: protective
orders, coupled with nondisclosure orders, that permit disclosure to the
parties while preventing disclosure to the general public.318
In this vein, numerous commentators have suggested that vendors’ claims
of trade secrecy cannot simply surmount the rights of affected individuals to
understand and challenge decisions that affect them.319 The scholarly
consensus appears uniform: simply privileging vendors’ assertions of trade
secrecy over the affected parties’ rights is inappropriate.320 Faced with
concerns about how to balance proprietary interests against those of
individuals who seek to challenge algorithmic determinations, however,
many have suggested that courts could employ protective orders to ensure
that vendors could be compelled to disclose proprietary information to
individual litigants while shielding the same information from public
view.321
From this perspective, the chief problem with algorithmic opacity is that
the individuals who are affected should have sufficient information to
understand how they are assessed, judged, and scored.322 Only by enabling
315. See H.R. 1655, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019).
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. See supra Part I.A (describing the Idaho plaintiffs’ rejection of a protective order);
supra Part I.B (describing the HISD protective order).
319. See, e.g., Citron, supra note 42; Citron & Pasquale, supra note 29.
320. See, e.g., Brenda Reddix-Smalls, Credit Scoring and Trade Secrecy: An Algorithmic
Quagmire or How the Lack of Transparency in Complex Financial Models Scuttled the
Finance Market, 12 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 87 (2011); see also Barocas & Selbst, supra note
28; Ram, supra note 49; Wachter et al., supra note 39; Wexler, supra note 29.
321. See Ram, supra note 49, at 717–18; Wexler, supra note 29, at 1410.
322. See Citron, supra note 42, at 30; Citron & Pasquale, supra note 29, at 5.
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the disclosure of this information can we vindicate individuals’ dignity,
autonomy, and due process rights. Within this paradigm, striking a bargain
with vendors that facilitates these important disclosures is often worth some
cost to public knowledge.323 And although some scholars have expressed
some unease with the impact that this solution might have on broader
interests in transparency, they have not critiqued it on these terms.324
This assumption that protective orders can appropriately balance the
interest in disclosure against intrusion into the proprietary interests of the
developer overlooks, however, the importance of information about
algorithmic governance to the public as a whole. Viewing algorithmic
decision-making through the lens of the law of access makes clear that these
new tools impact not only those who are directly affected by algorithmic
decision-making but also the general public. Extensive reliance on
proprietary decision-making methods runs headlong into the principles that
underpin transparency protections embedded in the First Amendment’s right
of access to government proceedings and open government statutes such as
FOIA.
As a procedural “fix” for problems of algorithmic opacity, protective
orders raise serious problems of their own. First, this framework makes
explicit an assumption that the methodologies of proprietary decisionmaking in government need only be disclosed to the individual plaintiffs who
choose to bring challenges. This assumption overlooks the resonance of calls
for more transparency and accountability for broader populations who are not
represented before the courts.325 Yet the implications of these cases for
unrepresented parties are clear: each of the algorithmic tools described in the
foregoing sections makes decisions that affect thousands of individuals.
Bringing these cases as class actions, as in the health-care context, or on
behalf of institutional plaintiffs, as in HISD, can partially solve the problem
of representing the interests of all, or as many as possible, of the affected
individuals. But protective orders, by design, impede the flow of information
to those individuals, as well as to the press and the public. This issue was
presented in sharp relief in the Idaho case, in which the plaintiffs rejected the
state’s offer to enter into a protective order, instead insisting that the
information they sought be disclosed not only to the named plaintiffs but also
to every participant in the budget waiver program.326
In fact, relying on individual plaintiffs to challenge—and gain access to—
proprietary decision-making tools on an ad hoc basis has serious social costs
323. See FRANK PASQUALE, BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 142–43 (2015) (setting out a “spectrum of disclosure”);
Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1503, 1530.
324. See, e.g., Wexler, supra note 29, at 1353 n.46 (raising a “potential conflict between
protective orders and Sixth Amendment public trial rights”).
325. This Article leaves for another day an exploration of how social movements’ calls for
algorithmic accountability also complicate these legal paradigms. Cf. Amna Akbar, Toward a
Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 476 (2018) (calling for legal scholars to
consider “movements’ visions for the world beyond what law can readily recognize or through
the lens of what the state adopts”).
326. See supra Part I.A.
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because the parties to these cases will be unlikely to push back on overly
broad assertions of trade secrecy or other proprietary interests. As the HISD
case demonstrates, in civil cases, the incentives to consent to a protective
order are typically high. Litigants who are challenging opaque algorithmic
decisions often settle, plead guilty, or accept disclosure of key information
regarding the challenged methodology subject to a protective order that
prevents the public from gaining access.327 This dynamic is all the more
pronounced when the litigants are poor individuals or underresourced
organizational parties.328 Although criminal defendants have been on the
front lines of efforts to compel disclosure of vital information related to black
box tools, many more have simply pleaded guilty when faced with
inculpatory evidence from algorithmic tools.329 It is hardly surprising that
individuals of limited means—such as Kevin Johnson, the defendant in the
FST case who was represented by the Federal Defenders of the Eastern
District of New York—would accept these tradeoffs.330
The result is that, by employing protective orders to make records
available to the parties but shielded from the public, the courts create a
framework of “information silos.”331 The silo vividly symbolizes the
problem of isolated decision-making within impermeable walls, unmoored
from relevant outside experience or expertise.332
Protective orders create silos by making disclosure to individuals
contingent on their silence to a broader audience. In essence, each individual
recipient of the information exists in his or her own silo, unable to
communicate that information to others who might want or need it. This is
precisely the issue raised by the disclosure of source code by Dräger, one of

327. See discussion supra Part I.C.
328. Gillian K. Hadfield, Exploring Economic and Democratic Theories of Civil
Litigation: Differences Between Individual and Organizational Litigants in the Disposition of
Federal Civil Cases, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1275, 1276 (2005).
329. See ProPublica Memorandum, supra note 178.
330. Kirchner, supra note 171.
331. See Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L.
REV. 499, 510 (2011). The term “silo” typically refers to barriers—whether formal or
informal—that prevent the flow of information, data, or managerial responsibility from one
area to another. The term is frequently used in the managerial literature to describe difficulties
coordinating across different areas of a business. See, e.g., James G. Bohn, Development and
Exploratory Validation of an Organizational Efficacy Scale, 21 HUM. RESOURCE DEV. Q. 227,
235 (2010) (“What are often called ‘silos’ represent a lack of coordination between teams in
an organization, and they are a recipe for disaster.”); Ron Ashkenas, Jack Welch’s Approach
to Breaking Down Silos Still Works, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 9, 2015),
https://hbr.org/2015/09/jack-welchs-approach-to-breaking-down-silos-still-works
[https://perma.cc/5RVW-GX6G] (describing how, despite advances in information
technology, “many organizations still have hierarchical, siloed, and fragmented processes and
cultures”).
332. See, e.g., Levy & Glicksman, supra note 331, at 510; see also Edgar H. Schein,
Organizational Psychology Then and Now:
Some Observations, 2 ANN. REV.
ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. & ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 1, 4 (2015) (describing the
fragmentation of an intellectual field into “many sub-cultures each with its own jargon and
preferred research methods and each evolving an intellectual silo disconnected from either
central theory and/or other silos”).
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the breathalyzer vendors.333 As a matter of policy, Dräger will disclose its
source code in any criminal proceeding, subject to a protective order.334 The
protective order makes clear the devil’s bargain: even though Dräger’s
source code is material to hundreds, if not thousands, of cases, the broader
public is permitted to know very little about how it functions.335 Indeed,
when two defense experts presented a report describing flaws in the code to
an annual convention of DUI lawyers—many of whom had worked on cases
involving Dräger source code—the company claimed it had been
defamed.336 The same issue would be confronted by Legal Aid attorneys
who represented individuals seeking to challenge their Medicaid waiver
benefit determinations or lawyers for the Houston teachers’ union who
represented teachers seeking to challenge their terminations.337
There might be good reasons, in some cases, to limit disclosure of
information to individual litigants instead of to the general public. For
instance, it is easy to imagine that certain medical information, key to the
outcome of a hearing on eligibility for Medicaid benefits, is private and not
subject to disclosure. In some settings, there might also be legitimate
concerns that automated systems could be “gamed” if they were too open.338
But when the information regards the methodology for how government
decisions are made, it is much harder to understand what interests could
possibly support secrecy. The entire framework of the law of access to
government proceedings and records is intended to ensure that information
critical to public debate and oversight is available to all, not just to a few.339
When information is sufficiently important to be disclosed to individuals,
making that disclosure contingent on a broader silence makes clear that the
compromise in fact comes at a significant cost to the public interest.340
New legislation may advance the interests of both defendants and the
public. In September 2019, Representative Mark Takano introduced the
Justice in Forensic Algorithms Act of 2019,341 a bill designed to promote
defense access to evidence in criminal proceedings.342 The bill, which was
influenced by the work of Rebecca Wexler and Andrea Roth, would amend
the Federal Rules of Evidence to forbid using the trade secret privilege alone
333. See discussion supra Part I.C.3.
334. See discussion supra Part I.C.3.
335. See discussion supra Part I.C.3.
336. Whittaker, supra note 167 (“Draeger sent the researchers a cease and desist letter
claiming defamation and alleging the two violated a protective order, designed to protect the
source code from leaking.”).
337. See discussion supra Parts I.A–B.
338. See Frank Pasquale, Restoring Transparency to Automated Authority, 9 J. TELECOMM.
& HIGH TECH. L. 235, 236 (2011) (explaining how concerns about gaming “provoked a shift
away from transparency”).
339. See supra Part III.
340. See Helen Hershkoff, Poverty Law and Civil Procedure: Rethinking the First-Year
Course, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1325, 1328 (2007) (“Litigation is not just a contest between
two opposing private parties. It also is a state-sanctioned process that uses public money and
is subject to constitutional constraints.”).
341. H.R. 4368, 116th Cong. (2019).
342. Id. pmbl.
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to shield evidence from disclosure to defendants.343 In addition, the bill
would task the National Institute of Standards and Technology with setting
standards for forensic software, including standardizing requirements for
“publicly available documentation” of the software, its training data, and its
testing methodology.344
The Justice in Forensic Algorithms Act does not address protective orders,
but it nevertheless reflects a powerful endorsement of public standardsetting, documentation, and testing of forensic algorithms. In doing so, the
Act partially responds to Ellen Goodman and Robert Brauneis’s call for
government agencies to require more documentation of algorithmic systems
to render them transparent.345 But while the due process and Brady issues in
the context of forensic evidence are pronounced, there is no reason that the
Act’s approach should be limited to forensic algorithms alone. Indeed, the
other applications of algorithmic governance described in Part I reflect the
same need for standardization, validation, and public documentation of
algorithmic decision-making systems to render them transparent and
accountable. If anything, the use of proprietary algorithmic decision-making
in contexts that deprive individuals of their civil rights has gone relatively
underreported and unnoticed by Congress.346 Congress should therefore
advance a similar approach in considering the use of algorithmic decisionmaking systems in civil contexts, including (if necessary) by amending the
Medicaid Act and by limiting the provision of federal funding in contexts
where state agencies rely on black box proprietary decision-making systems.
C. The Challenge to Transparency Values
More generally, algorithmic tools sometimes appear to defy the traditional
logic of government oversight—that “sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants,” that the public’s presence can benefit proceedings, and that
public oversight can benefit the operations and structure of governance.347 If
we accept the premise that algorithmic governance is more “efficient,
valuable, powerful, and objective” than its human counterparts, then why

343. Id. § 2(b).
344. Id. § 2(a)(2). In addition, the bill would require the National Institute of Standards
and Technology to set standards for crime labs’ validation of forensic software and their public
reporting about their validation studies. Id. § 2(a)(2)(D).
345. Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 13, at 166 (calling for additional documentation).
346. At the state and municipal level, efforts to promote legislative study and oversight of
algorithmic governance are still nascent. See, e.g., State Artificial Intelligence Policy,
ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/state-policy/ai/ [https://perma.cc/EF57MYZQ] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020) (documenting efforts in New York, Vermont, Alabama,
and elsewhere to engage in oversight and study); see also Margot K. Kaminski & Andrew D.
Selbst, Opinion, The Legislation That Targets the Racist Impacts of Tech, N.Y. TIMES (May
7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/07/opinion/tech-racism-algorithms.html [https://
perma.cc/UG2Y-LVGF] (criticizing the Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019 as
insufficiently robust).
347. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (quoting LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER
PEOPLE’S MONEY 62 (1933)).
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value transparency at all?348 Maybe we can look toward a future in which
government-by-machine need not bother with the administrative headache
and “burden” of responding to FOIA requests and producing documents.349
Indeed, the value of public observation and participation in the democratic
process looks a lot like the kind of subjective, “clinical” judgment at which
advocates of actuarial measures look askance. If actuarial measures are
already accurate and fair, it’s difficult to understand how “[p]ublic scrutiny
of a criminal trial enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the
factfinding process” or “fosters an appearance of fairness, thereby
heightening public respect for the judicial process.”350
In other words, algorithmic governance resists the straightforward
application of existing transparency mechanisms, but not only because of
practical obstacles. The major threat to government transparency in an
algorithmic age is not simply that processes have become obscure,
automated, and outsourced. Rather, it is easy to see how the promise of
“objectivity”—even if it is false—can undermine the core assumptions of
transparency law. When government decision makers can disclaim
responsibility because they have simply adopted an ostensibly neutral
recommendation generated by a technological tool, it diminishes the public’s
ability to hold the government accountable.
As such, algorithmic governance also lays bare the need for enhanced—
not minimized—transparency and accountability measures. The publicoriented perspective on government oversight evinced in the transparency
case law helps to inform judgments about when accountability is necessary,
why transparency is helpful, and how we might want to approach algorithmic
decision-making in law and in government.351 While current research
(perhaps rightly) focuses on the individuals and institutions who are directly
affected by algorithmic governance, the adoption of these methodologies also
creates a ripple effect, shielding the decision-making process from scrutiny
by affected parties and by the public.352
Updating transparency law for the algorithmic age will take work. To
begin, courts should critically examine the application of trade secrets
protections to shield government decision-making processes from scrutiny.
As articulated in Part II.A, this practice lacks any basis in FOIA’s case law
and is in substantial tension with the fundamental values of FOIA. These
fundamental values also suggest some potential changes in government
procurement and contracting processes. Informed by the principles of open
government, agencies and courts should avoid contracting for proprietary
decision-making tools with vendors who require broad secrecy provisions.
348. Christian Sandvig, Seeing the Sort: The Aesthetic and Industrial Defense of “The
Algorithm,” MEDIA-N, http://median.newmediacaucus.org/art-infrastructures-information/
seeing-the-sort-the-aesthetic-and-industrial-defense-of-the-algorithm
[https://perma.cc/
E68S-MMDG] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
349. See generally Pozen, supra note 43.
350. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982).
351. See supra Part III.
352. See supra Part III.
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The emergence of algorithmic governance also suggests a more vital role
for affirmative—rather than reactive—disclosure of key information about
how the government functions. FOIA and the First Amendment do not
require the government to create new records or interpret existing policies—
they only require the production of existing records in response to an
individual request.353 But affirmative disclosure of key information about
how algorithmic governance works would vindicate values of open
government, even though it is not required by existing law. New York City
has adopted this approach in its pivotal algorithmic accountability bill, which
requires a new task force to develop a “process for making information
publicly available that, for each agency automated decision system, will
allow the public to meaningfully assess how such system functions and is
used by the city, including making technical information about such system
publicly available where appropriate.”354
This affirmative approach to transparency is preferable to a framework that
relies on individual claimants to challenge opacity on an ad hoc basis.
Individual due process challenges are insufficient to guarantee meaningful
public oversight and accountability for algorithmic tools.
CONCLUSION
True algorithmic transparency goes far beyond an explanation of a
challenged action to the individual who is affected. Rather, as challenges to
opacity illustrate, algorithmic governance implicates core values of
transparency law: access to government records and to key information
necessary to understand government decision-making. Viewing algorithmic
governance through the lens of access law makes clear that automation and
privatization pose a serious threat to the existing framework, which
privileges reactive disclosure of existing government records to individual
requesters. Rather, just as algorithmic governance portends a new era in
government decision-making, it must be accompanied by new forms of
transparency to protect the vital role of public oversight in our democratic
system.

353. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 162 (1975) (explaining that FOIA does
not require agencies to “create explanatory material”).
354. N.Y.C. Council 2018/049 (N.Y. 2018) (enacted).

